How could a technocracy be structured?

19 2 Technocracy and Democracy Before transhumanism is discussed further, the term technocracy should be developed in order to be able to take a targeted look at the topic. Technocracy is a relatively new term from the US 1920s. This is usually understood to mean a “rule of experts and technocrats” or “a government that orients its decisions (exclusively) on scientific and technical arguments and practical constraints and disregards the political and democratic formation of wills.” 50 The decision-making power of politicians a parliament is ousted in it by the technocrats. Technocrats can therefore be seen as the personnel of a technocracy who, according to the technocratic theory, do not need a political worldview, since their actions should simply be based on technology. As a rule, those who propagate technocracy are referred to as technocrats. Critics of technocratic theory have again tried to point out its ideological moments, which will be elaborated on later. In everyday language, administrative staff who are characterized by a strictly rationalistic style of thinking and use reasoning based on practical constraints are referred to as technocratic. “Democracy as popular rule is opposed to technocracy as physical rule. And since it is people who exercise such dominance, technocracy, in contrast to democracy, means the rule of an elite of specialists and experts, technicians in the broadest sense of the word. The possible conflict between democracy and technocracy is therefore obvious: since the whole people cannot possibly be a people of experts, the rule of technocrats could theoretically undermine and undermine democracy. "51 50 Schubert and Klein," The Political Dictionary: Technocracy " . 51 Greiffenhagen, “Demokratie und Technokratie”, 55. 20 Thus the theory of technocracy stands in an ambivalent relationship to the field of politics and politics. A parliamentary democracy in its institutional nature, which is the historical starting point in this context, creates the conditions for the possibility of political positioning of individuals, parliamentary groups and parties. If this space of possibility is not given, as in a technocracy in ideal form, the political in this sense is not given the opportunity to develop. According to this definition, a technocrat cannot be either social democratic or conservative. From this point of view, the technocracy stands in opposition to the political and therefore initially appears apolitical, although a technocrat can certainly appear politically. According to technocratic theory, and here a thesis by Schelsky is anticipated, the political position is only a means to an end. However, this would be the case on the basis of a very narrow concept of politics, which reduces the political to positions that result from an ideological foundation. With a broader political term, which understands under politics “any kind of influence and shaping as well as the enforcement of demands and goals, be it in private or public areas” 52, the technocratic gets a political dimension, since it is the way of influencing and Structured design of private and public life. According to this, the technocratic would be a certain form of the political. Especially after the Second World War, technocracy was set in opposition to democracy. In a representative democracy, rule of the population is mediated through various institutions and organizations, such as parliament, the government, the judiciary and political parties and organizations. In the ideal of a parliamentary democracy, the population is both the subject and the object of rule. It is a subject more in the abstract sense, in the form of regular elections and irregular referendums. The political will-formation of the population is thus expressed less in the direct action of individuals than in indirect activity via political parties and associations. The potentially conflicting interests of the various parties should be conveyed through the political institutions and, in the best case, a compromise should be found. This process takes place in a social space and can be difficult and 52 Schubert and Klein, “Das Politiklexikon: Politik”. 21 can be tedious because it depends on the balance of power, tactics and alliances. The political decision is therefore dependent on a large number of factors. In any case, in the theory of a democracy, the political will of the population should be the decisive factor. So, even in a parliamentary democracy, it is by no means possible to say that the “dichotomous model of rulers and ruled” 53 has been abandoned. However, despite all the restrictions, sovereignty should reside with the population and not with an elitist group.54 This very conception is called into question by the technocrats. In the USA there was a technocracy movement after the First World War, which manifested itself in several organizations. A central assumption of the theorists of the movement was that "changes in the forms of economic reproduction [...] must lead to changes in the social order in all its parts" 55; which, analogous to the Californian ideology, can be understood as a consequentialist technological determinism. The technocrats did not formulate any fundamental criticism of the capitalist relations of production, but primarily denounced inefficiency at all levels. Science, rationality and a 'discipline of machine processes' should be set against the consequences of the global economic crisis. The rejection of economic benchmarks such as value, price and profit is interesting, since these are not physical quantities and are therefore viewed as irrelevant and obsolete. Even property and possessions were considered technologically obsolete. Spurred on by the Russian October Revolution, the social science outsider and key word for the Thorstein Vehlens movement called for a 'technological and organizational revolution' for the USA.56 In contrast to Plato's ideal state, in Vehlen's ideas it is not the philosophers at the head of the state, but technicians and engineers who manage society, which is perceived as an industrial organization, directly, without a political apparatus. 53 Greiffenhagen, “Demokratie und Technokratie”, 55. 54 Cf. ibid., 54 ff. 55 Senghaas, “The Technocrats. Review of the Technocracy Movement in the USA ", 285. 56 Cf. ibid., 282 ff. 22 In a technocratic manifesto published by the Technical Alliance in 1921, it says:" The mismanagement and chaos, the industrial mechanism through arbitrary rule (functional -) Imposed on foreign interests, have reached such a point that many technicians recognize the compulsion to gather their strengths in a program of industrial coordination that is not based on belief but on exact knowledge. [...] The solution to the industrial problem is primarily socio-technical (engineering); therefore it is essential that an alliance of technicians be formed to determine the current non-technical control of industry and to make it clear to the public, and finally to put the technical knowledge of the country at the service of the people so that industry is freed from arbitrary rule can. ”57 The basic thesis of the technocrats can be summed up as follows:“ Politics, based on democratic or autocratic opinions, could not contribute to the solution of factual questions. Engineers could be at odds as politicians, but not as engineers. ”58 The equation of technicians and technocrats is definitely controversial. Alfred Frisch sees the technocrat as a by-product of the computer, which finds its legitimacy in increasingly complex government mechanisms and a dependent specialization of politics. In contrast, the technician is only an executive organ. The difference should be made by a will to lead and an eye for the bigger picture.59 Due to the stabilization of political and economic conditions, the movement ebbed after the Second World War and lost its importance. But that did not mean that the technocratic ideas were out of the world. Historically, however, the absolute openness of the socio-technical strategies of the technocratic movement is unprecedented. With Schelsky it can be shown that there can also be technocratic tendencies without a conscious technocratic worldview. 57 Ibid., 287. 58 Ibid., 288. 59 Frisch, “The Future of Technocrats”, 91-23 2.1 Helmut Schelsky and the theses of the technical state Helmut Wilhelm Friedrich Schelsky was a German sociologist and is considered one of the most famous students by Arnold Gehlen and is therefore attributed to the Leipzig School. From 1932 he was an active National Socialist in the SA, the NSDStB, and the NSDAP and took part in the Second World War as a company commander and first lieutenant in the Wehrmacht, which is why he was considered controversial in the post-war period. In 1961, Schelsky sparked a long-lasting debate about technocracy and democracy in West Germany with his essay Man in Scientific Civilization. At this point, his theses should be traced as precisely as possible by the technical state. In his work, Schelsky would like to put the basic anthropological assumptions of the time to the test. It is about the consequences of the spread and effectiveness of science on modern life. The comprehensive scientification of our way of life makes a new assignment of the relationship between people and the world necessary.60 According to Schelsky, the traditional understanding of technology, which relates to real technology, must be dropped. The technical-philosophical view that technology is a tool-like organ continuation of the human being is no longer tenable in view of modern technology that has become universal.61 While Schelsky uses real technology to "plan intervention in the factual outside world", i.e. "that tool-like, nature-changing and nature-dominating action ”, modern technology is spreading to“ the production and processing of objects that were previously beyond technical access as a natural condition or historically and personally developed way of life and which seemed to be given to our actions as nature or historical environment ”62 . With regard to Jacques Ellul, Schelsky identifies three major areas of technology: 60 See Schelsky, “The human being in scientific civilization”, 449 f. 61 See ibid., 455. 62 Ibid. 24 "1. the techniques of production, the production of material goods, industrial-historical ones based on machine technology, today scientifically multiplied in their methods; 2. the techniques of organization, that is, the methods of mastering and creating social relationships, which make up the content of economic and social sciences and which have also largely transformed jurisprudence into an organizational theory; 3. the techniques of changing, mastering and generating the soul and spirit inner life of the human being, which we want to denote with the term human techniques; In addition to the social sciences already mentioned, psychology, psychiatry, pedagogy, journalism, opinion research, etc. are busy at work in this technical manipulation of humans. ”63 Although social and human technologies existed before modernity, these are“ today in the form of a non-tool-like real technology ”and are“ subjected to the methods of modern goods production ”64. To make this more precise, Schelsky introduces several distinctions between traditional and modern technology: “1. Modern technology is based on the analytical decomposition of the object or the action into its ultimate elements, which cannot be found in nature. […] 2. Modern technology is based on the synthesis of these elements according to the principle of maximum effectiveness […] ”65. 3. The principle of traditional technology can be seen in the fact that “man, as an organic deficient being, developed technology as an artificial organ continuation.” 66 Although this has been retained in principle in modern technology, it no longer touches the essential core of the matter . Traditional technology implies a “human-world relationship […] in which humans come across, in principle, tool-like organs of nature, master and exploit them.” 67 The decisive difference is made by human consciousness, which is used for analysis 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid., 456. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid., 457. 67 Ibid. 25 of the world and of new synthesis.68 In summary, according to Schelsky, it can be said of modern technology that it analyzes all objects and breaks them down into "unnatural basic elements" in order to synthesize them according to the "abstract principle of the highest effectiveness" 69 , for which there should be no model in nature. The relationship of humans to a found world, to which they have adopted a tool-like organ behavior, is replaced by a relationship to a technically generated world, which, according to its essence, is the construction of humans themselves. “[I] n technical civilization, man confronts himself as a scientific invention and technical work. With this, however, a new relationship of man to the world and to himself is indeed set, which is spreading over the earth with technical civilization. "70 Following Gotthard Günther, Schelsky introduces a 'metaphysical change of position', because for the" classical philosophy of Greece and all metaphysics of the religions of salvation, quite apart from earlier forms of religion ”, it is true that this was determined by a“ fundamental world experience of an experiential existence ”71. “The experiencing ego was faced with a being of such overwhelming objective power and such unswerving objective consistency that it was practically impossible for the isolated psyche to assert itself against it [...] Man thus surrenders to the superhuman being of nature. Even his previous classical Archimedean technique [...] is an unconscious admission of his weakness. It is fundamentally defensive. From a practical point of view, its task is to protect it against the forces of nature and to detach it from it; logically and theoretically, however, it is nothing more than a subordinate imitation of objective reality processes. ”72 The result of modern technology is a decoupling of man from nature. 68 See ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid., 458. 72 Günther, “Creation, Reflection and History”, 630 f quoted from Schelsky, “The human being in scientific civilization”, 458 f.26 “Under the experimental access of the physicist, the physical reality of what disappears we used to call nature, in an inextricable network of immaterial relations, the meaning of which to assimilate lies entirely outside the capacity of our previous consciousness. ”73 This is not limited to the view of nature or physics, but also leads to technical and scientific manipulation of human beings in social and psychological terms.74 “The historical institutions that have arisen 'naturally' to date are the results of human will. But if we begin today to change these results through conscious manipulation, we are disavowing the original historical will that produced them. We have now reached a point in world history at which the human will turns against itself and rejects its previous activity. ”75 Schelsky would like to leave the level of speculation behind and fathom the essence of the new production realities. It is by no means about technology per se, but about a certain form: scientific technology. Analyzing and synthesizing, identified as the essence of modern technology, corresponds to the “function of the human understanding and its sensory perception”, that is to say, according to Immanuel Kant, to the “human spirit itself” 76. Schelsky considers Kant to be the philosopher of modern technology, since he originally uncovered the truth: “that we know because we construct; the reconstruction of the world from our knowledge […] ”77. The human being is increasingly becoming his own object of action orObject of knowledge, because it is no longer limited to changing nature or even 73 Günther, “Creation, Reflection and History”, 648 quoted from Schelsky, “Man in scientific civilization”, 459. 74 Cf. Schelsky , "Man in Scientific Civilization", 459. 75 Günther, "Creation, Reflection and History", 648 quoted from Schelsky, "Man in Scientific Civilization", 459. 76 Schelsky, "Man in Scientific Civilization" , 460. 77 Ibid. 27 to create anew, the human being is also reconstructed and reshaped on the level of the body, the soul and the social.78 In addition, every new technical object creates new social and psychological facts, which in turn are based on social, economic and human technologies need to be brought under control. Human beings are confronted with the factual laws they have created themselves on a social and psychological level, which in turn amounts to a technical, i.e. planned and constructed, solution.79 This "cycle of self-determined production" is the "inner law of scientific civilization". 80 and suppress the question of the meaning of means and ends. "Man detaches himself from the compulsion to produce in order to submit to his own compulsion to produce again." 81 Schelsky awakens with the question of whether, with "the production of ever new technical equipment and technical environments", it is not only the society and psyche of people who are producing new things, but also “the social, emotional and spiritual nature of man is always recreated and reconstructed” 82, the impression that this is posed with a critical intention. In fact, he affirms the assessments he has described. This is where Schelsky's culturally pessimistic character from the Leipzig School emerges. The Theses of the Technical State Schelsky begins his remarks on modern statehood with a definition of domination, namely “the permanent relationship of power between people”, which he describes as the “basic political, at least the state phenomenon; from slavery to the conquering states of early antiquity to enlightened absolutism ”83. To date, rule has passed through various social forms and political legitimations, but there has always been a direct relationship of rule between people. This direct relationship has been rejected in modern democratic societies 78 Cf. ibid. 79 Cf. ibid., 461. 80 Ibid., 460. 81 Ibid., 461. 82 Ibid., 460 f. 83 Ibid., 464. 28 and replaced by a new form of rule based on legality and rationality. An order was established based on “mediation through impersonal and rational norms” 84. In this state in which “everyone rules and is ruled at the same time”, rule has shifted to “the setting of orders and norms” 85, which can lead to “normative revolutions”. This does not mean that political rule has been overcome in a democracy, but that a “unity of will and agreement of wills between rulers and ruled” 86 is sought. 87 The “construction of scientific and technical civilization” is a “new basic relationship between man and man” Man created ”88 by displacing both the old direct relations of domination and the political norms and laws of the factual legality of a scientific-technical civilization. This factual legality is to be seen neither as a classical political decision nor as a political norm. “In place of a political will of the people comes the factual law that man produces himself as science and work.” 89 In a sense, democracy is deprived of its substance.90 In order to substantiate his thesis, Schelsky tries to show that on the one hand technology is becoming more state and on the other hand the State is becoming more and more technical, which must inevitably lead to the technical state. He identifies three causes for this, which, however, have to be considered in the context of the historical context. 1. When technical means become a means of political power, the state intervenes and asserts its influence, as it does not want to lose its sovereignty. The state has become a carrier of 84 Ibid., 465. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Cf. ibid., 464 f. 88 Ibid., 465. 89 Ibid. 90 See ibid. 29 Technology.91 2. Another cause is identified in the financing of modern technologies. The investments in research cannot be borne by the private sector alone, but must be pooled by the state beyond self-interest. 3. Schelsky assumes that the modern state itself takes over its coordination solely for reasons that result from the immanent logic of technology, since the functionality of modern technology could not be guaranteed without its leadership. The state monitors and guarantees the general security of our existence through detailed legislation.92 These assessments were made in 1961, retrospectively in the final phase of state interventionism, and can no longer be easily maintained with the socio-political developments that were initiated in the 1980s. With this diagnosis of the time, Schelsky comes to the conclusion that the nature of the state has fundamentally changed. While state intervention on technology was limited to a few areas in the nation-states of the 16th to 19th centuries, the interdependence is becoming more universal. The state "basically unites all forms of technology in their highest effectiveness as state action" and becomes a "universal technical body" 93 or, to put it another way: the ideal overall technician. Since the state is virtually merging with modern technology, it must be viewed as a universal technical body. Although the entire technology is subordinated to a state raisonné, this is “nothing more than the practical constraint of the multiple technologies with which the state is realized today.” 94 The goal of the state is the “highest effectiveness of the technical means available to it” 95. Sovereignty is thus evident not only in the monopoly of force and a state of emergency, but also in the power to decide on the “degree of effectiveness of all in it. 91 Schelsky cites the railways, the aircraft industry and, in particular, nuclear energy as examples. Human techniques such as compulsory schooling are also explicitly mentioned. (Cf. ibid., 466.) 92 Cf. ibid., 466 f. 93 Ibid., 467. 94 Ibid., 468. 95 Ibid. 30 technical means ", whereby he reserves the" highest effectiveness and can practically place himself outside the limits of the use of technical means that he imposes on others "96. Nevertheless, the state submits itself in its goals to the “general law of scientific civilization” 97, since here a state has arisen in which the means determine the ends. So who is the ideal typical statesman of this technical state? As already explained, Schelsky assumes that the state is viewed as an organization or technical body that is supposed to ensure optimum returns according to the highest level of efficiency. For the modern statesman, the state is neither the expression of the will of the people nor the embodiment of the nation, the instrument of a class and certainly not a creation of a god. "The factual constraint of the technical means, which want to be served under a maxim of optimal functionality and performance, removes these questions about the nature of the state." 98 Modern technology does not need any legitimation, it just works. Decisions are derived from a given technical principle, which is why the statesman we are talking about is not a ruler, but rather an analyst, designer, planner and implementer. Normative will-formation is needed here at most as a means of legitimation.99 The theory of the technical state put forward by Schelsky differs in one important point from the common definitions of technocracy, such as those formulated by Greifenhagen, for example. The rule of the technicians is understood to mean a transfer of decisions from elected politicians and company owners to the managers, i.e. the “coordinating and planning experts of the organization” 100, who thus become a new “ruling class”. Schelsky denies this, since the technicians only carry out “what is in contradiction” 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid., 469. 99 Cf. ibid. 100 Ibid. 31 of the legality of apparatus and the respective situation as material necessity. ”101 Thus, the ruling class is not replaced, but the traditional structure of rule changes. No one rules anymore, but a machine that is properly operated.102 From this point of view, modern politicians are only fictitious decision-makers, since in the technical state politics is applied to complex scientific techniques at all levels, which implies highly complex factual laws. The techniques and the technicians practically dictate the path to the solution for the politician. The politician is more and more dependent on expert opinions which limit the political scope for decision-making.103 In reality there are always contradicting reports from which the politician has to choose, but Schelsky claims that with "optimally developed scientific and technical knowledge" the experts should in principle come to the same solution: "The better the technology and science, the less the leeway for political decisions." 104 Schelsky continues his thoughts and explains that politicians in a very classic sense as representatives of particular Interests in a parliament increasingly come into conflict with the experts of the scientific-technical state, because they have become the bearers of the general interest.105 At this point, however, Schelsky does not define what a general interest could be, but simply describes it negative as opposed to a m particular interest. He goes on to write: "In relation to the state as a universal technical body, the classic conception of democracy as a community whose politics depends on the will of the people, is increasingly becoming an illusion." is nevertheless closer to the general interest than purely politically motivated decision-makers. According to Schelsky, purely scientifically and technically justified decisions can be made in their 101 Ibid. 102 cf. ibid., 469 f. 103 cf. ibid., 470 f. 104 ibid., 471. 105 cf. ibid. 106 ibid., 472. 32 essentially do not depend on any democratic formation of will. This is why the technical state deprives democracy of its substance, even though, according to Schelsky, it is not anti-democratic.107 “If the political decisions of the state leadership are made according to scientifically controlled material laws, then the government is an organ that administers material necessities, and parliament is a control organ for factual correctness. ”108 Thus, contrary to the ideal of a democracy, the population is becoming less and less of a subject and more and more of a pure object of domination by technology. Through various human techniques, and here Schelsky cites opinion research, information, propaganda and journalism, modern political will-formation has become a “scientifically deducible and manipulable production process” 109. Thus democracy becomes a competition for the share of the vote in general elections with the help of scientific and technical means, which abolishes a classic, democratic formation of will. While the equality of all citizens is based on the humanistic assumption that "reason is equally innate to all and leads to a personal judgment based on arguments made clear by yourself", modern, scientific election campaign methods rely on "psychological influence, the impression of mood and opinion, the response of the unconscious soul forces and the associated, technically generated permanent emotionalization ”110, which run counter to the conditions of a reasonably balanced judgment. In addition, the facts of modern topics can no longer be adequately assessed by 'normal human sense', but that additional information is usually necessary.111 In the technical state, the role of ideas and ideologies is also fundamentally changing. In contrast to the 18th and 19th centuries, normative worldviews are no longer decisive for political decisions; the relationship has been reversed. 107 Cf. ibid. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 Cf. ibid., 472 f. 33 Ideologies are not a possible or potential source for political action, but have become an ideology of justification for what is already carried out under the substantive laws. Politicians are more and more forced to adapt their political ideas to reality.112 “The technical argument prevails unideologically, therefore works below any ideology and thus eliminates the level of decision-making that was previously supported by ideologies.” 113 Schelsky sums up his previous ones Thoughts put together as follows: The “appearance of direct rule of people over people” dissolves “in the social and political sense [...] from within”, whereby the “transformation of democracy into the 'technical state' [...] does not occur Revolution in the social or political sense, no constitutional change, no ideological conversion ”, but an automatic consequence“ of the increasing use of scientific techniques of all kinds ”114. In the assumption of a consequentialist technological determinism, a situation is increasingly establishing itself in which the political relationships of people are mediated by a self-created scientific and technical factual law.115 2.2 The factual constraint argument and the normative turn of the philosophy of technology Schelsky solved with the theses on the technical state started a debate in West Germany, the content of which is in part also of interest for this study. Above all, the postulation of a practical constraint, which, among other things, states that the best technical solution can be found using fully developed scientific methods and has a central position in Schelsky's theory, was questioned by contemporary critics. Kurt Lenk pointed out that the topos of the technical state can only be understood sufficiently under consideration of the anthropological foundations of Arnold Gehlen. As in a Marxian terminology, the term alienation is 112 cf. ibid., 473. 113 ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 Cf. ibid., 474. 34 used, but cleaned of economic and class-theoretical aspects. Alienation here means the transformation of the immediate social framework of action into the autonomous legality of institutional orders, i.e. the practical constraint. In this change, Gehlen and Schelsky see a general anthropological process, which is absolutely necessary for the continuation of a civilization stage once it has reached. Without this discipline, which is both necessary and desired, humans would not be able to survive with their chaotic excess of drive and a lack of instinct regulation at the same time. Alienation does not have to be overcome here, but rather stabilized. Lenk calls this an ontologized alienation thesis and contrasts it with an authentic, Marxian alienation theory. In this, alienation results from a class relationship in which the proletarian class manufactures products from human energy, but has no power of disposal over its own products. From this perspective of the ontologized alienation thesis, technology is characterized as a non-ideological, factual power. The experts here are the true representatives of factual law or the general interest, while politicians appear as mere representatives of particular interests. The continuous progress of the superstructure is explained as a general interest of the species and is determined solely by the rationality of the practical constraint. Politics as normative goals set by people themselves thus become superfluous. The technocratic ideology is of use to those who speak out against fundamental social changes.116 Richard Saage classifies Schelsky in a “technocratic conservatism”, in whose worldview technology “drives its own further development out of itself, so that a 'self-evident' Dynamism becomes its characteristic sign. ”117 Martin Greiffenhagen also points to a number of interesting points of view in the debate.In West Germany in the 1960s it was mainly conservative social scientists, in addition to Schelsky, among others, Hans Freyer, Arnold Gehlen and Ernst Forsthoff, who affirmatively conjured up a technocracy.118 Interestingly, they were often supporters of the conservative revolution 116 Cf. Lenk, “Theory of Topos' Technischer State '”, 45 ff. 117 Saage,“ On the topicality of the term' Technischer Staat '”, 38. 118 Cf. Greiffenhagen,“ Demokratie und Technokratie ”, 55. 35 during the Weimar Republic, which“ opposed western civilization and western parliamentarism emphasized the elements of power, vitality and 'action' […]. ”119 So the argumentation has changed fundamentally, but the enemy image of parliamentarism has remained the same. In all of Schelsky's argumentation, political domination is negated; In general, the question arises whether the technical state in the sense of Schelsky is still a political state: “Strictly speaking, the technocratic state no longer has a political goal. It is pure functionality and relieves its members of the question of what should happen and why it should happen. ”120 In summary, it can be said that many critics, not without good reason, have exposed the factual constraint argument itself as an ideology. Schelsky in particular was overtaken by a 're-ideologization' at the end of the 1960s. In his later work Die Arbeit do others from 1975 he criticized representatives of sociology and pedagogy as a “scientifically educated reflection elite who are taking on a new priestly rule and are digging the water away from the factual laws through scientifically guided and media-effective, disseminated subject and salvation certainties” 121. With the decline of state interventionism and the emergence of the market-fundamentals phase, the role model of the state in western industrial societies changed from the 1980s onwards. Away from regulation and nationalization towards free markets, deregulation and privatization. From this phase onwards, until further notice, it was no longer possible to speak of the emergence of a technical state in the sense that every technology was nationalized. Schelsky himself wrote that his theses do not correspond to his current reality, but represent a model theory that can help us to bring structural laws to light.122 This does not exclude that his model can be applied under changed technical and political-economic framework conditions , but the model would have to be modified. 119 Ibid., 61. 120 Ibid., 58. 121 Schäfers, “Schelsky's Theory of the Technical State: Factual Laws as a Frame of Reference for Action Management and Social Control”, 508. 122 Cf. Schelsky, “The Man in Scientific Civilization”, 468. 36 Günter Ropohl sees technological determinism as the guiding principle of the general understanding of technology up to the middle of the 20th century. Ropohl understands this to mean an idea in which "technical development and its consequences happen with their own regularity, without human volition and planning needing or being able to intervene." 123 He has the origin of this thinking in the "optimism of the Enlightenment" and "rationality." der Moderne ”, which are set up to“ eliminate the ambivalence of action, that is, through knowledge, foresight and planning to purposefully realize what is desirable and imagined and to reduce undesirable consequences of action to a minimum ”, summarized in the statement:“ Who Acts sensibly, acts well. ”124 Ropohl differentiates between genetic and consequent determinism. The former assumes an "inevitability and autonomy in the development of technical innovations", caused by the "self-movement of scientific efforts" 125 of Homo Faber, which inevitably always introduce new technical developments. The technical development is an anthropological constant here. Consistent determinism is based on the “inevitability of the consequences of technology” 126. In its culturally critical and pessimistic variety, technology robs people of their freedom and subjects them to their unrestricted rule.127 From this point of view, Schelsky's theory is based on a consequent determinism in a culturally critical, pessimistic variety, albeit in an affirmative way. Ropohl identifies a normative turn in the understanding of technology that began in the last third of the 20th century. This means a departure from the technological determinism in favor of a conception of a technology that can be controlled by values ​​and goals. A symptom of this is that the reflection on technology in the purely technical and also humanities area 123 Ropohl, Ethik und Technikicherung, 21. 124 Ibid., 19 f. 125 Ibid., 21. 126 Ibid., 22. 127 Cf. ibid. , 21 f. 37 has exceeded more and more towards general political debates. In West Germany, this turning point on the humanities level was primarily triggered by reactions to Schelsky's theses on the technical state, which Ropohl, however, benevolently describes as brilliant.128 In everyday life, among other things, the growing environmental movement and the conflicts over the use of nuclear power in the 1980s were an expression of this turning point . In concrete terms, this turnaround is expressed in a changed conception of technical solutions. It is no longer assumed that there is a single technical solution that is appropriately the best, as Schelsky still had in mind, but that there are a multitude of possible solutions that have to be developed in an interdisciplinary manner. This means that the possibilities of technical developments are perceived as shapeable and based on social and ethical values, i.e. normative. Ropohl's assessment leads to an analysis of two new specialist areas that emerged in the 1960s, engineering ethics and technology assessment. At this point there is no room to adequately assess these specialist areas, especially with regard to whether they actually influence technology development. But Ropohl rightly points out that the understanding of technology development has changed. For a concept of technocracy it would mean that even if classical politics were to be replaced by technological methods, there would still be a pre-technical, normative field that practically opened up a new field of political disputes. The appearance of autonomy and material necessity shows itself here as ideology. On the other hand, due to this development, the political can only appear in conjunction with a technology. The question to be asked here is whether this is really a genuinely modern phenomenon and has not always been part of politics. Before, in the fourth chapter, transhumanism is interpreted with Schelsky's theses and asked about its technocratic content, it is first necessary to take a closer historical look at selected parts of prehistory and the various forms of contemporary transhumanism. 128 See ibid., 24 f.