Has influenced Japanese culture in China

Consideration of the recent and current development of the bilateral

Relationship between China and Japan in selected examples

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Table of Contents

1 Introduction

2. The bilateral relationship between China and Japan - dual strategies

2.1 Conflict over resources - the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands

2.2 Conflict over the past - the textbook debate

2.3 The mass riots in spring 2005

3. Closing words

4. Bibliography

5. Author and copyright notice

1 Introduction

"The Chinese relationship with Japan is worse than ever" [1] - wrote Thomas E. Schmidt on March 23, 2006 in an article in the feature section for "DIE ZEIT".

In my term paper, I would like to go into the previous presentation of February 6, 2006 and address the question of whether the current relationship between the People's Republic of China and Japan is really that bad. The public opinion of the population is particularly important to me, and not just that of the politicians.

In the following, I will first deal with the bilateral relationship of the last forty years by giving an outline of significant events in the past. Then I will go into the current situation with the help of two selected examples.

2. The bilateral relationship between China and Japan - dual strategies

The People's Republic of China's interest in Japan is not only based on historical experiences of an expansive and military nature, but also stems from Japan's high technological, industrial and economic performance. [2]

Both are the result of a successful Japanese "modernization process" [3], which neighboring China would like to use to build its own infrastructure. On the other hand, the Chinese feel extremely threatened precisely because of this progress made by Japan, since Japan is always feared as a competitor. So the Chinese government is pursuing a kind of “double strategy” [4], because Beijing does not want to do without financial aid from Japan under any circumstances. Nevertheless, since the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, the Chinese have been extremely sensitive to a renewed threat from Japan. [5]

In order to achieve all that the People's Republic hopes for in terms of Sino - Japanese developments, it needs a good and functioning relationship. Often, however, Japan was used more as a means to an end by China in the second half of the 20th century. With Kissinger's visit to Beijing in 1971, which was initially kept secret, and the resulting relaxation of Sino-American relations, Japan came under increasing pressure. Although the Japanese then also asked China to open official talks, Beijing did not allow this without first setting three conditions, all of which revolved around the "status of Taiwan" [6]. This reaction by the Chinese government to Japan's rapprochement alone should earn China the respect it deserves. [7]

By the end of the 1980s, the Chinese government weakened Japan's reputation in Asia and, through its policies, also widened the gap between Japan and the United States. In addition, the government in Beijing was not only able to control but also influence the published opinion of the Japanese about China [8].

A rapprochement between Tokyo and Moscow was also prevented by Beijing. After all, when the People's Republic tried to reunite with Russia in the 1980s, Deng XiaoPing stirred up distrust in the Soviet-Japanese relationship by creating irritation on the Moscow side in order to consider himself safe. He achieved this by encouraging the Japanese to strengthen their own defense force. He also praised the Japanese-American relationship. [9]

However, economic hopes repeatedly led Beijing to point out the complementarity of the two countries, not least because China is primarily interested in technology transfer. In contrast to Japan, the People's Republic has enough raw materials, workers and a large market. Japan, on the other hand, has the necessary technology and capital, but has a growing shortage of labor. [10]

Not only Beijing, but Tokyo too is in a dilemma. On the one hand, the Japanese government prevents renewed uprisings and unrest among the Chinese population through financial aid and thus contributes to a certain degree of economic stability. Because if the situation on the Chinese mainland were unstable, this would also have serious consequences for Japan. Apart from the potentially devastating effects on the economic situation in Asia, Tokyo fears the influx of refugees from the People's Republic. [11]

On the other hand, the Japanese government is just as afraid of China's economic success being too great. This not only means a loss of power and influence in Asia and the rest of the world, but above all also enormous environmental pollution, for example from acid rain or China's growing demand for oil. [12]

Both developments would therefore not be an ideal case for Japan. Tokyo is also angry because Beijing is willing to cooperate economically with Japan, but hardly wants to cooperate politically. An example of this is China's vehement rejection of a permanent seat for Japan on the UN Security Council. [13]

Serious mistakes were made on both sides in the 1990s and they were discussed publicly. In 1995, when the Chinese President visited South Korea, the Tokyo government expressed positive comments about Japan's 35-year colonial rule over Korea. Beijing was outraged for the first time in public, but knew how to use the Japanese statement for its own purposes - namely to keep the distrust of Japan alive in Asia. [14]

Also in 1995, just a few days after the atomic bomb commemorations in Japan, China carried out nuclear tests. Tokyo's annoyance was predictable. Hardly anyone in Beijing would have expected that the government threatened to stop the non-repayable financial aid for the current year with immediate effect. Once again, the Chinese government knew all too well how to get out of the affair by exhorting Japan to think about the horrific events during the Sino - Japanese War. With that, China regained its respect and hit Japan's sore spot. As a result, the Tokyo government endeavored to adopt a more cautious policy towards China in the years that followed. [15]

However, especially in the last two to three years, a number of points of contention have become topical again, which inevitably lead to public expressions of opinion by both countries. In the following I will use two examples to show the reasons for the growing anti-Japaneseism in the People's Republic of China, which were particularly responsible for the mass riots in April 2005.

2.1 “Conflict over resources” [16] - the Diaoyu / Senkaku islands

The Japanese Senkaku Islands are located in the middle of the East China Sea. In China, the small archipelago located about 400 kilometers west of the Japanese island of Okinawa and north of Taiwan is called Diaoyu. [17]

This tiny patch of land is the object of a territorial conflict between the People's Republic of China, Taiwan and Japan. [18]

The archipelago is said to have belonged to China since the Qing dynasty, but Tokyo is convinced that "the islands were only discovered by the Japanese in 1884" [19]. In 1895 the Senkaku were captured by Japan and handed over to the United States after the surrender in the Sino - Japanese War in 1945. Since the archipelago finally returned to Japan in 1972, the territorial dispute has not settled. [20]

At first glance, one seems astonished by the lively interest shown by the countries in the islands. Not only are they so small that they cannot be found in a normal atlas, but they are also uninhabited. But if you know about the presumed oil and gas reserves around the archipelago, which Japan is entitled to under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which came into force on July 20, 1996, you understand all too well why China is claiming the islands for itself. It is no longer a secret that China's energy requirements, and thus above all its oil consumption, have been skyrocketing for years. [21]

In the mid-1990s, the Senkaku Islands experienced almost all kinds of protests: from deployed fighter jets to the construction of a Japanese lighthouse and the Chinese crossing the twelve-mile zone several times to setting up the flags of all the nations involved. [22]

The dispute reignited in 2003 when Japan renewed the lease agreement with a private owner of three islands and also announced that the group of islands might be made available to American troops for military training purposes. The immediate result were protests by all those involved around and on the islands. [23]

It is a fact that Japan is so interested in the energy sources in the fishing area of ​​the Diaoyu Islands that "coastguard boats have to patrol the islands 365 days a year around the clock" [24].

The various “definitions of the respective economic zones of both countries” [25] represent a central problem in resolving the conflict. Japan's maritime law zone, within which the Tokyo government is entitled to all mineral energy sources and raw materials, extends over 200 nautical miles. This was enshrined in the aforementioned “Law of the Seas” - the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. China, on the other hand, also decided in 1996 to raise its economic zone "from 370,000 to three million square kilometers" [26].

Beijing is refusing to recognize the rights of the Japanese with regard to the Diaoyu Islands. Japan, on the other hand, demands from the People's Republic of China to hand over knowledge and research results about the occurrence of energy sources in the area in question to Tokyo and at the same time announces that it will assert its claims on any raw materials found. [27]

It is therefore to be expected that the Senkaku / Diaoyu conflict issue will cause new debates and protests for a long time to come, and that the Sino-Japanese relationship will therefore remain extremely tense.

2.2 Conflict about the past - the "textbook debate"

Founded in 1997, a Japanese group has since campaigned for a new edition of Japanese history and civics books. [28]

The association, which by its own account has around 9,500 members, is called Tsukurukai for short. Officially, it is the "Society for the Creation of New History Textbooks", known in Japan as "Atarashii rekishi kyokasho wo tsukurukai". [29]

The members - including high-ranking politicians, economists and university professors - advocate the trivialization and censorship of Japanese war crimes in Japan's schoolbooks. The declared aim of the Tsukurukai is to reawaken the "pride of the nation and the longing for a pre-war Japan with the emperor at the center" [30]. [31]

This is particularly critical as the New History Textbook Society is turning to the younger generation of Japan to carry out its plan. The books should be used in the grade levels in which the young people can still be influenced easily; namely mainly in the middle school. Scary, but certainly taken into account by the Tsukurukai, is an opinion poll that shows that around 37 percent of Japanese citizens “get their understanding of history from school books” [32]. [33]

Two main reasons are probably responsible for the low distribution of books in Japan's schools so far - eighteen out of around 11,100 schools have used the controversial books so far [34]:

On the one hand, the demanding language, which is often difficult to understand for students of the above-mentioned levels, and on the other hand, above all, the massive, public rejection of the books by all strata of the Japanese population. It is questionable, however, why the Ministry of Education has now again approved the textbooks of the "historical revisionist" group [35] for use in Japanese schools. [36]

Of course, the debate about the new teaching aids has long since become international. Since 1982, Japan's neighbors Korea and China have publicly criticized the Tsukurukai and their glossing over Japanese war crimes. [37]

The People's Republic in particular, which repeatedly draws attention to Tokyo's lack of apology for the atrocities during the Second World War, is reacting particularly sensitively. The Chinese people perceive the rising nationalism in Japan with horror.

An example would be that Japanese teachers now risk fines if they refuse to sing the national anthem at school festivals [38]. Another example that repeatedly becomes a point of international conflict is the controversial visit by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine. Precisely because the Japanese constitution strictly separates state and religion, it is difficult to understand why a high-ranking politician visits a place of prayer on official occasions that not only stands for religion and imperial cult, but is also the grave of convicted Japanese war criminals . [39]

In order to dispel nationalist prejudices, the Tsukurukai published excerpts from the textbook (new edition 2005) on its official website (www.tsukurukai.de). However, this tended to strengthen the opinion of the opposing side. The period of the Second World War is dealt with in the revised edition, for example, within about twenty pages.

It makes you think that the textbooks of other publishers are now unfortunately also being shortened in order to align with the new competitor. Only one of the books approved for teaching by the Ministry of Education takes up the story of the so-called comfort women and estimates of the number of victims in the Nanjing massacre. The editors justify that the chapter on comfort women has been deleted in all other history books with the fact that many teachers have increasingly complained that it is difficult for them to address the topic of sex in class.In addition, the term 'comfort women' was invented in retrospect and is therefore not historically correct in any case. If the books even write from December 13th, 1937, they only speak of the 'incident' instead of the 'Nanjing Massacre'. In the history book of the Tsukurukai the following is written about the massacre: [40]

[...] In August 1937, two Japanese soldiers, one an officer, were shot to death in Shanghai (the hub of foreign interests). After this incident, the hostilities between Japan and China escalated. Japanese military officials thought Chiang Kai-shek would surrender if they captured Nanking, the Nationalist capital; they occupied that city in December. * But Chiang Kai-shek had moved his capital to the remote city of Chongqing. The conflict continued. [...] [41]

This addition can be found as a lower-case footnote:

Note * At this time, many Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed or wounded by Japanese troops (the Nanking Incident). Documentary evidence has raised doubts about the actual number of victims claimed by the incident. The debate continues even today. [42]

After South Korea, Beijing and Tokyo have now agreed to set up a joint historians' commission to clarify the points in question in their shared history. [43]

It is to be hoped that this will sooner or later clear the conflict out of the way. The trend towards the shortening and censoring of all history textbooks rather than the books of the Tsukurukai is a growing problem. Because of the violent protests, it is hardly to be expected that the circulation of the controversial textbooks will increase. [44]

2.3 Resolving the Conflict of the Population - the Mass Rioting in 2005

In the spring of 2005, young Chinese in particular took to the streets against Japanese institutions in the People's Republic. Some journalists spoke of the largest riots since "the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999" [45]. In April alone, around 20,000 people took part in each demonstration [46]. The main reasons for the protests were the renewed topical textbook debate and Japan's aim for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. In addition to the broken panes of Japanese shops and the siege of Japanese consulates and the embassy in Beijing, the demonstrators made racist slogans and calls for a boycott of Japanese products. [47]

The organization of the mass uprisings took place mainly through the new communication media. For example, sites like sina.com or china918.com called for protests online. The question remains why the websites concerned were not - as is so often the case - censored by the government in Beijing. And the Chinese security authorities did not intervene to prevent the mass demonstrations. Only a protest march across the polluted Tian’anmen Square was stopped. [48]

On the whole, anti-Japanese uprisings by the Chinese government are not exactly inconvenient, as the points of conflict I have described on the previous pages show. In addition, there is, for example, Japan's interference in the Taiwan question and the “rejection of the lifting of the EU arms embargo against China” [49]. [50]

As expected, after the demonstrations in April last year, Japan demanded a plausible explanation as to why the government and security agencies had not intervened and publicly blamed the patriotic education in China's schools for this. [51]

Beijing, on the other hand, accused Tokyo of not paying enough attention to the bilateral relationship between the two countries. In the end, the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Wu Dawei officially spoke out against the mass riots after a few discussions with his Japanese counterpart. [52]

In a subsequent conversation with Hu Jintao, Koizumi apologized for Japan's mistakes. Hu demanded, however, that the words "should finally be followed by deeds" [53]. For example, Japan could stay out of the Taiwan question. [54]

With the government banning unauthorized demonstrations in Beijing in spring 2005, the situation improved immensely. For example, the local security authorities first sent mass text messages in Beijing and Shanghai warning against participating in illegal protests. [55]

Although the situation appeared to be under control, the Chinese government had to act in early May due to the ongoing boycott of Japanese goods. Again the population should be brought to their senses with the help of the media. In newspaper articles it was pointed out that "in the age of globalization" [56] such actions also unnecessarily endanger Chinese jobs. [57]

In general, the national idea and standing up for the interests of one's own country is also quite dangerous, because it is well known that such a popular demonstration can tip over and “turn against one's own government” [58].

3. Closing words

At the end of my thesis I leave it to the reader whether he or she agrees with Thomas E. Schmidt's statement - "the relationship between China and Japan is worse than ever" [59].

I myself am of the opinion that the relationship is definitely as bad as it has been in a long time and nothing fundamental will change in the near future.

On the contrary - I am sure that the difficult relationship between the People's Republic and Japan will become more explosive over the next few years and decades, not only in Asia, but also internationally.

4. Bibliography:

- DIE ZEIT, No. 13; 03/23/2006

- Giese, Karsten: Anti-Japanese nationalism - conditional reflex and dangerous calculation. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3).

- Giese, Karsten / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3),

- Glaubitz, Hermann: On the way to world power. China in the field of tension between Japan, Russia and the USA. In: Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten / Michael Lackner (eds.): Country report China: Politics, economy and society in the Chinese cultural area. Bonn 1998.

- Möller, Kai: The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China 1949-2004. An introduction. Wiesbaden 2005.

- Nabers, Dirk: Japan wants an agreement with China on gas production in controversial waters. In: Japan aktuell, XIII.2004 (6).

- Schmidt-Glintzer, Helwig: The new China. From the Opium Wars to the present day. Munich 2004.

- Staiger, Brunhild et al. (Ed.): Country report China. History, politics, economy, society, culture. Darmstadt 2000.

- Tsukurukai - Homepage: www.tsukurukai.com; 03/24/2006

- Wieczorek, Iris / Dirk Nabers: Open Wounds in the Sino-Japanese Relationship - Japanese School Books, the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3).

 

[1] see DIE ZEIT No. 13, 23.03.2006

[2] total Paragraph see Hermann Glaubitz: On the way to world power. China in the field of tension between Japan, Russia and the USA. In: Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten / Michael Lackner (eds.): Country report China: Politics, economy and society in the Chinese cultural area. Bonn 1998; P.516.

[5] sat. Paragraph see Hermann Glaubitz: On the way to world power. China in the field of tension between Japan, Russia and the USA. In: Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten / Michael Lackner (eds.): Country report China: Politics, economy and society in the Chinese cultural area. Bonn 1998; P.516 f.

[6] see Hermann Glaubitz: On the way to world power. China in the field of tension between Japan, Russia and the USA. In: Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten / Michael Lackner (eds.): Country report China: Politics, economy and society in the Chinese cultural area. Bonn 1998; P.517.

[8] sat. Paragraph see Hermann Glaubitz: On the way to world power. China in the field of tension between Japan, Russia and the USA. In: Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten / Michael Lackner (eds.): Country report China: Politics, economy and society in the Chinese cultural area. Bonn 1998; P.517.

[11] sat. Paragraph see Hermann Glaubitz: On the way to world power. China in the field of tension between Japan, Russia and the USA. In: Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten / Michael Lackner (eds.): Country report China: Politics, economy and society in the Chinese cultural area. Bonn 1998; P.520.

[13] see Karsten Giese: Anti-Japanese nationalism - conditional reflex and dangerous calculation. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3), page 3.

[14] sat. Paragraph see Hermann Glaubitz: On the way to world power. China in the field of tension between Japan, Russia and the USA. In: Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten / Michael Lackner (eds.): Country report China: Politics, economy and society in the Chinese cultural area. Bonn 1998; P.519.

[15] sat. Paragraph see Hermann Glaubitz: On the way to world power. China in the field of tension between Japan, Russia and the USA. In: Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten / Michael Lackner (eds.): Country report China: Politics, economy and society in the Chinese cultural area. Bonn 1998; P.520 f.

[16] see Iris Wieczorek / Dirk Nabers: Open Wounds in the Sino-Japanese Relationship - Japanese School Books, the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3), p.16.

[17] see Iris Wieczorek / Dirk Nabers: Open Wounds in the Sino-Japanese Relationship - Japanese School Books, the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3), p.15.

[18] sat. Paragraph see Iris Wieczorek / Dirk Nabers: Open Wounds in the Sino-Japanese Relationship - Japanese School Books, the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3), p.14.

[19] see Dirk Nabers: The Senkaku / Diaoyutaik conflict. In: Karsten Giese / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3), p.13.

[21] sat. Paragraph see Iris Wieczorek / Dirk Nabers: Open Wounds in the Sino-Japanese Relationship - Japanese School Books, the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3), p.15.

[22] sat. Paragraph see Iris Wieczorek / Dirk Nabers: Open Wounds in the Sino-Japanese Relationship - Japanese School Books, the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3), p.15.

[23] sat. Paragraph see Iris Wieczorek / Dirk Nabers: Open Wounds in the Sino-Japanese Relationship - Japanese School Books, the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3), p.15.

[24] see Iris Wieczorek / Dirk Nabers: Open Wounds in the Sino-Japanese Relationship - Japanese School Books, the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3), p.16.

[25] see Dirk Nabers: Japan wants an agreement with China on gas production in disputed waters. In: Japan aktuell, XIII.2004 (6).

[26] see Iris Wieczorek / Dirk Nabers: Open Wounds in the Sino-Japanese Relationship - Japanese School Books, the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3), p.16.

[27] sat. Paragraph see Dirk Nabers: Japan wants agreement with China on gas production in controversial waters.

In: Japan aktuell, XIII.2004 (6).

[28] see Iris Wieczorek: The textbook debate and the Yasukuni problem. In: Karsten Giese / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3), p.15.

[30] see Iris Wieczorek / Dirk Nabers: Open Wounds in the Sino-Japanese Relationship - Japanese School Books, the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3), p.11.

[32] see Iris Wieczorek: The textbook debate and the Yasukuni problem. In: Karsten Giese / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3), p.15.

[35] see Iris Wieczorek: The textbook debate and the Yasukuni problem. In: Karsten Giese / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3), p.16.

[37] See Iris Wieczorek / Dirk Nabers: Open Wounds in the Sino-Japanese Relationship - Japanese School Books, the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3); P.11.

[38] see Iris Wieczorek: The textbook debate and the Yasukuni problem. In: Karsten Giese / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3), p.18.

[39] sat. Paragraph see Iris Wieczorek / Dirk Nabers: Open Wounds in the Sino-Japanese Relationship - Japanese School Books, the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3); P.13.

[40] sat. Paragraph see Iris Wieczorek: The textbook debate and the Yasukuni problem. In: Karsten Giese / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3), p.16.

[42] see ibid.; 03/24/2006

[43] See Iris Wieczorek / Dirk Nabers: Open Wounds in the Sino-Japanese Relationship - Japanese School Books, the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands. In: China aktuell, XXXIV.2005 (3), p.13.

[44] cf. Iris Wieczorek: The textbook debate and the Yasukuni problem. In: Karsten Giese / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3), p.17.

[45] see Karsten Giese: Playing with Fire - Anti-Japanese Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy. In: Karsten Giese / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3), page 5.

[48] ​​sat. Paragraph see Karsten Giese: Playing with Fire - Anti-Japanese Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy. In: Karsten Giese / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3), p.6.

[49] see Karsten Giese: Playing with Fire - Anti-Japanese Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy. In: Karsten Giese / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3), p.7.

[51] sat. Paragraph see Karsten Giese: Playing with Fire - Anti-Japanese Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy. In: Karsten Giese / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3), p.8.

[53] see Karsten Giese: Playing with Fire - Anti-Japanese Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy. In: Karsten Giese / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3), p.9.

[55] sat. Paragraph cf.Karsten Giese: Playing with Fire - Anti-Japanese Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy. In: Karsten Giese / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3), p.10.

[58] see Karsten Giese: Playing with Fire - Anti-Japanese Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy. In: Karsten Giese / Dirk Nabers / Iris Wieczorek: Japan and China: Power wrangling in East Asia. In: Japan aktuell, XIV.2005 (3), p.12.

[59] see DIE ZEIT No. 13; 03/23/2006

5. Author and copyright notice

This article was created by Ms. Pia Bisch as part of the introductory seminar "Regional Studies China / Greater China" at the Eberhard-Karls University Tübingen, Faculty of Cultural Studies, Institute for Sinology, in the winter semester 2005/2006.

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