What does Pakistan like about India?

Wolfgang-Peter Zingel

In: Werner Draguhn (Ed.): India 1998. Politics, economy, society. Hamburg: Institute for Asian Studies. 1998. pp. 112-128.

India and Pakistan, the "distant neighbors",(1) celebrated the 50th anniversary of independence in 1997: by no means together, not on the same day and without causing a stir with us. The reasons for this are that relations between the two neighbors were tense from the start and that Pakistan became free on August 14th - at midnight - and India on August 15th - at midnight. And the fact that the celebrations in Germany, despite the traditionally excellent relations with both countries, attracted so little attention may be due to the fact that we perceive South Asia neither as a successful growth region nor as a threatening trouble spot.

The problem is already evident in the terminology: "South Asia" has been the conceptual replacement for "India" since 1947;(2) "India" no longer stands for the geographical area on and behind the Indus (from which India derives its name according to a common interpretation), but for the political unit "Republic of India", the "Indian Union"; "India" also stands for the history and culture of the Indian or Indo-Pakistani subcontinent. "Pakistan" is therefore not a real counterpart and is only perceived by us as a state, as the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan"; only a few associate history and culture with Pakistan, but religion, Islam, the way India is associated with Hinduism. Such an equation of the two states with their main religions can be found, for example, in Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations", combined with the ominous implication of inevitable conflicts along fault lines (fault lines), where different cultures meet.(3) At first glance, this may be convincing: the Indian Union and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan - after three armed conflicts - are still hostile to each other and, thanks to their nuclear armament, are becoming a serious threat internationally (albeit less in Europe than in the USA) Perceived world peace.(4) On closer inspection, however, it turns out that the clashes were only about border wars, if one disregards the special case of the liberation war in Bangladesh. This leads to the assumption that there is a tacit mutual agreement on the desirability of these bilateral tensions, a "great war" between the two "useful enemies" (convenient enemies) but should be avoided whenever possible.

All the more so since India and Pakistan also see themselves as economic partners, as geography and history suggest; Isolation from the neighbor does not fit into a world of the removal of trade barriers in the course of globalization and regional cooperation.(5)

The historical dimension: two nations theory and division of India

When British India was divided at midnight on August 14, 1947 and two Dominions were "released" into independence, the problem of living together was the problem communities, the Hindus and Muslims, by no means solved this. Their territory had gradually come under British rule over the previous two centuries, but was by no means uniformly administered; There was no political or administrative forerunner of Pakistan in either British or pre-British times; but neither did it exist for the new state of India: British India and the Mughal Empire were not suitable for it either. The latter is more historically claimed by Pakistan, which, especially at the beginning, did not see its history as a territorial history at all. The so-called two-nation theory was the basis for the demand for a state of its own. In his programmatic speech as President of the Muslim League on the occasion of its annual meeting in Lahore in 1940, its President, the lawyer Muhammad Ali Jinnah, said: "The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine, and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based on conflicting ideas and conceptions [...] To yoke together such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority, and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state. "(6) The most ardent advocates of Muslim statehood had lived in the United or Northern Province (U.P.) on the Ganges and Jamuna in the diaspora and had moved to (West) Pakistan after the partition; Millions - Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs - have been driven out and fled; the population exchange was not complete, so that a third of the Muslims of British India remained in the Indian Union.

The Hindu and Sikh minorities in Pakistan were much smaller, also relatively: a consequence of the demarcation of the border in 1947 and the ensuing flight and displacement. The demand for a separate state for the Muslims of India essentially concerned the two large provinces of Punjab and Bengal, in which the Muslims made up the majority. In fact, they were divided, so that East Punjab and West Bengal fell to India. The largest movements of refugees took place within the divided provinces. While the Hindus and Sikhs also from the other parts of (West) Pakistan (Sind, NWFP, Baluchistan) almost all fled or. were expelled, many Muslims remained in the minority areas of India, i.e. especially in the Ganges plain (U.P.) and on the Dechan (Hyderabad). That is why there are around 120 million Muslims in India today, many of whom have relatives in Pakistan. Even if they, or their parents, decided in favor of India in 1947, they are repeatedly faced with doubts about their loyalty, most recently in the Indian election campaign in 1998 on the part of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and related organizations (Shiv Sena, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VTP), Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)(7)). As the Indian opposition politician and former Prime Minister V. P. Singh emphasizes, this becomes evident less in the official party manifesto of the BJP and in the public appearances of the party leaders than in the local party meetings.(8)

Indian Muslims fear that they will become second-class citizens without being able to hope for help from Pakistan: Pakistan, once founded with the claim to offer the Muslims of the subcontinent a home and protection, has only been home to a third of them since the secession of Bangladesh . Only in the former East Pakistan lived a sizeable Hindu minority (the Sikhs without exception fled to India); Too few (and mostly members of the lowest castes) live in the rest of Pakistan today to be able to serve as "bargaining chip". "Communal" disputes in India, i.e. between followers of different religions, are followed with great sympathy in Pakistan, without the verbal attacks by Pakistani politicians being of any help; With regard to the situation of Indian Muslims, they are rather counterproductive, they prevent the two countries from rapprochement and deepen the distrust of the muhajirin, the Urdu-speaking refugees from northern and central India and their descendants in Pakistan, who have to watch their problems being the subject of domestic political calculation. In contrast to the other large ethnic groups of Pakistan, who set the tone in the new state at the beginning, they do not have their own territory; even in Karachi their dominant position is threatened by the influx of Punjabis, Pashtuns and Sindhis from the hinterland and Afghans. Since then, through the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), they have regained political weight, which the rulers are trying to take into account with irreconcilable rhetoric against India.

A comparable group of refugees in India are most likely the Sindhis: they too had to leave their home province; Sindhi is the only national language of India that is not also the official language of an Indian union state. The Sindhis are considered to be an economically and politically successful group, L. K. Advani, one of the leaders of the BJP, is probably the best-known Sindhi.

"Flash Point" (flashpoint) of relations, according to the Pakistani Foreign Minister, but Kashmir is:(9) As is well known, Kashmir was one of the hundreds of princely states of India that were indirectly ruled by the British and remained largely autonomous internally; with the abandonment of India by the British, they could choose to join one of the two new Dominions or to gain independence. Like no other princely state, Kashmir seemed to have the prerequisites for statehood: as one of the largest and most populous states in British India, it bordered both India and Pakistan as well as China and Afghanistan, which separated it from the Soviet Union by a narrow corridor . However, a Hindu maharaja ruled over a majority of Muslims, but both rulers and subjects wanted independence. It was only when Muslim irregulars from the north-west frontier province of Pakistan invaded to "liberate" Kashmir that the Maharaja declared his accession to India in October 1947; Indian troops landed in the Kashmir Valley within a few hours and stopped the advance of the Muslims. Pakistan had to look on fainted because the then British commander in chief of the Pakistani troops refused to act without orders from his (British) superior in New Delhi. This probably prevented an Indo-Pakistani war on a large scale, but the crisis also gave rise to Pakistani rearmament. Through the mediation of the United Nations, an armistice came into effect on January 1, 1949 along a line that has (more or less) still exists today. A solution to the cashmere question is not in sight. There are a number of reasons for this: the details of the time and place of the declaration of accession are disputed, including whether the Maharaja acted voluntarily.(10) It is less controversial - also on the part of Pakistan - to what extent the Maharaja was legitimized at all to make such a far-reaching decision for his subjects; India as well as Pakistan have mostly proceeded astonishingly legalistic (Pakistan still exists today on Junnagadh and Manavadar, located on the coast of Gujarat, where the (Muslim) Nawabs had declared their accession to Pakistan, but India, with reference to the predominantly Hindu population, invaded). Opinions differ in India and Pakistan as to whether and under what conditions a referendum could decide the final fate of Kashmir. While Pakistan points out that Nehru has agreed to such a referendum, the Indian side - insofar as such a concession is confirmed at all - demands the prior withdrawal of all "foreign" troops. India later granted Jammu and Kashmir the status of a union state, albeit with some special rights (Article 370 of the Indian Constitution), while Pakistan insists on the status of a disputed territory, sometimes excluding the so-called northern areas (Northern Areas) or the Gilgit agency.

Since the 1989 uprising in Kashmir, which could not be suppressed even with a massive police and military presence, there have been international fears that the conflict will spread, which could have consequences beyond South Asia. A defuse of the conflict, also through mediation offers from abroad, is not yet in sight. Proposals for solutions that apply "locally" repeatedly discuss a division on the basis of religious affiliation, either by relatively autonomous cantons within an independent state of Kashmir, or by assignment to the neighbors. At first sight this seems convincing: the areas already controlled by Pakistan are all Muslim; in the Indian-controlled Kashmir valley the Muslims predominate, in Jammu Hindus and Sikhs. In sparsely populated Ladakh it is mainly Buddhists (the majority of whom are threatened by immigration), whose future neighbors would have to argue about the division of Jammu and Kashmir: in view of the persecution of Buddhists in Tibet, there is hardly any alternative. China has already controlled parts of Ladakh since the early 1960s: unnoticed by India (and with reference to the "unequal treaties"), China annexed the Aksai Chin in the late 1950s in order to build a direct road connection from Sinkiang to Tibet; As is well known, India lost the war with China in 1962. The fate of the so-called Kashmiri Pandits, the approximately 200,000 Hindus (Brahmins) who fled the Kashmir Valley and conduct intensive public relations work in India, is likely to be much more important for relations with India.

The military dimension: three wars

The three Indo-Pakistani wars were by no means always "great wars" between which phases of complete calm lay: The first war was limited to Kashmir and was largely supported on the Pakistani side by Muslims from this state Irregulars, worn. The second war broke out after the promising talks between India and Pakistan were broken off by Nehru's death (May 1964) and Ayub Khan saw an opportunity for Pakistan to improve its position.(11) At first it was only about the oil-producing areas in the Rann of Kutch; "a few patrols deep into Indian-held Kashmir" led (in August) to fighting along the armistice line,(12) to which India responded with an attack on a broad front in the Sialkot-Lahore area and made some land gains until 23.9. a truce went into effect. With Soviet mediation, the Tashkent Treaty was concluded the following year (1966) status quo ante restored. The warring parties submitted to an international court of arbitration, which in 1968 set the final limit in the Rann of Kutch. The third, and for the time being last, war was triggered when General Yahya Khan, who had succeeded General Ayub Khan as military dictator, refused to hand over power to the newly elected parliament, in which the East Pakistani, who pressed for regional sovereignty, formed the majority, and in a military action attempted to wipe out the political and intellectual elite of East Pakistan. In the course of the civil war that followed, millions - an estimate of up to 10 million - Bengali fled to India. After India had secured support in the Soviet Union and Pakistan declared war on India, Indian troops conquered East Pakistan within a few days and forced the Pakistani army to surrender unconditionally; the pak succeeded in the west. Troops did not make the hoped-for quick breakthrough; so it came to the armistice on 16.12.19971 and 1972 to the agreement of Shimla, which confirmed the loss of Bangladesh and in the west the status quo restored.

Skirmishes continued on the armistice line in Kashmir afterwards; For years a war of attrition has been going on on the Siachen Glacier, the highest theater of war in the world. There are also other attacks that India and Pakistan accuse each other of.

The defeat against China had permanently shaken Indian self-confidence. Until then, only Pakistan was seen as a threat, but it had not been able to prevail in Kashmir; The dispute over the water of the Indus tributaries was settled through international mediation in the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. In 1959, China had already invaded Tibet; India offered refuge to the Dalai Lama and many of his followers; that was the end of the Indo-Chinese fraternity of the 1950s (Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai) past. Since 1958 the military ruled in Pakistan, who fought on the side of China: they stayed out of the Tibet question, terminated the American bases in 1960 after the U2 debacle, refused to accept the US request to support India in 1962 and stepped down 1963 border areas with China. In the war with India in 1965, however, Pakistan could not record any gains, China behaved neutrally, as in the war of 1971. Since then, Pakistan alone no longer poses a serious threat to India, but together with China, which also woos the leadership in Rangoon, so that India is exposed to a complete embrace on the land side. This is the only way to understand the high Indian expenditures for the military, in which Pakistan plays an important but no longer the decisive role. An isolated consideration of the Kashmir problem is therefore unlikely to lead to a viable solution.

The different security situation in India and Pakistan led to different foreign policies. While India was concerned with independence, not only vis-à-vis the former colonial power, Pakistan looked from the beginning for allies against its main neighbors: against the overpowering India, by which it saw its existential questioning, and against Afghanistan, which the demarcation of 1893 ( Durand line), which cut through the settlement area of ​​the Pashtuns, did not want to accept and claims to "Pashtunistan", ieraised the areas to the right of the Indus (and therefore voted against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations, for example). Hopes for effective support from the Muslim states (then: Egypt, Turkey) were not fulfilled; India (Nehru) was one of the leaders in the non-aligned movement; Pakistan joined the Western Defense Alliance (CENTO, SEATO) at an early stage and made it possible for the United States to fly from Pakistan over the Soviet Union. But as early as the early 1960s, Pakistan began to diversify its external relations: the young energy minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, brought the Russians into the country to explore its natural resources and established relations with China; Henry Kissinger later traveled to Beijing via Pakistan to negotiate the terms of the end of the Vietnam War; This resulted in the USA-China-Pakistan-Iran-Saudi Arabia axis, which crossed in Pakistan with the new Soviet Union-India axis. Shortly before that, Bhutto had finally come to power, if only in the rest of the state. The Shah of Iran and the also isolated Ghaddafi from Libya helped him in his undertaking to bring Pakistan out of isolation. In 1974 Bhutto managed to hold the Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore. Nevertheless, Pakistan did not experience an international appreciation that should have worried India: Pakistan only slowly recovered economically from the loss of more than half of its population, the producer of its main export fruit (jute) and a guarantor of development aid (poverty in East Pakistan). At the same time as India and Bangladesh, Pakistan tried socialist experiments ("Islamic socialism"), which were socialist only at the beginning and above all in rhetoric. Pakistan had no weight among its powerful allies, the alternative Soviet Union was "occupied" by India; The fact that the Soviet Union was allowed to carry out some major projects in Pakistan that Western donors had spurned (Karachi steel works) made little impression on the USA. Relations with the USA did not improve either when General Zia took power in 1977 and founded an "Islamic" regime that was a deterrent to foreign countries (public flogging, etc.). The dramatic climax was reached in 1979 when the Ayatollah Khomeini detached Iran from the western alliance system; in Pakistan, Zia hanged his predecessor Bhutto after a dubious trial; in the fall, Pakistan met the sanctions of the Symington Amendment. Just a few days later, as a result of an attack on the Kaaba in Mecca, schoolchildren and students attacked the American embassy in Islamabad. Relations between Pakistan and the USA were at a low point; In terms of foreign policy, Zia could only count on the conservative Arab states and possibly on Iran. Shortly after OPEC raised oil prices for the second time, it found itself embroiled in a violent war with Iraq. Zia's attempt to define Pakistan as a Southwest Asian, Islamic nation had failed. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan alone "saved" Pakistan, which within a very short time became a "front-line state". According to the logic of the Arthashastra Des Kautilya, an early Indian forerunner of Machiavelli, was a friend of Afghanistan as an enemy of India's enemy, far more than would have emerged from the 1971 Indo-Soviet agreement. For India this meant a position that was actually incompatible with the principles of the struggle for independence and the non-aligned movement, a situation from which India was only liberated by the withdrawal of the great powers from the war in Afghanistan (Geneva Convention of 1988).

After President Reagan took office in the USA (1981) and at the height of the Cold War, Pakistan was able to draw on the full economically and militarily; The end of the superpowers' involvement in Afghanistan also meant that Pakistan was downgraded as a recipient of economic and military aid: since 1990 sanctions were again imposed on it because of its nuclear plans and it was almost classified as a terrorist state. The power poker between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the presidents and the military leadership have reduced Pakistan's foreign policy importance; Pakistan's disruptive potential alone, i.e. the support of a warring party (Taliban) in Afghanistan (access to Central Asian energy reserves) and its controversial nuclear and missile policy, have prevented it from falling into insignificance in foreign policy. Relations between India and China improved noticeably and were briefly better than they had been in decades;(13) until the BJP came to power in India in spring 1998 and explicitly justified its nuclear tests with the threat from the "other neighbor", i.e. China; Theoretically, a peace dividend could have set in here, which had already been expected at the end of the Cold War.

Since India's importance for Pakistan is much greater than the other way around, the influence of Pakistani foreign policy on India is not so easy to determine. After the two armed forces in 1965 and especially in 1971 there was no longer any reason for hasty reactions. India was able to establish that neither the Western allies and China nor the Islamic states were prepared to allow themselves to be drawn into the South Asian clashes. The 1971 Bangladesh war was more a welcome opportunity than the occasion for the 20-year friendship pact with the Soviet Union in 1971, which was intended to underline India's independence. The Afghanistan war, in which India showed benevolent support for the Soviet Union, quickly made it clear to India that it could have no interest in the Soviets (as they blatantly threatened) overrun Pakistan. The war also offered the Pakistani army the opportunity to modernize, one of the reasons for India's massive armament since then. India and Pakistan stayed out of the first Gulf War (Iraq-Iran), and both countries were affected by the second Gulf War (Kuwait), albeit for different reasons: Pakistani in particular worked in Kuwait and Indians in Iraq. India's support for the Allies did not go as far as Pakistan, but India's good relations with the Islamic states also became apparent; diplomatic relations with Israel (1992) were established without complications.

The extent to which the two governments are fueling the conflicts in their respective neighboring countries (Kashmir, East Pakistan) is the subject of a heated discussion that is unlikely to be free from deliberate indiscretions and disinformation; the sometimes uncoordinated coexistence of civil and military services complicates the situation. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's son Murtaza and his "Al-Zulfikar" in Sind are said to have received logistical support in India; In revenge, Pakistan is said to have given refuge to supporters of the Khalistan movement in Punjab;(14) Riots in Karachi, Bombay and elsewhere are always the foreign hand of the neighbor (usually not explicitly mentioned).

With the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the value of regional alliances that the USA had set up to contain the "red tide" also became relative; only in South Asia there was a gap because India did not want to join an alliance; Pakistan also had to recognize early on that this alliance system did not serve its interests. This also applied to the civilian offshoot of the CENTO, the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), which linked Pakistan with Turkey and Iran; Afghanistan refused to join. This organization barely developed life and lost its function after the Iranian revolution. As early as 1981, the President of Bangladesh had called for a South Asian community based on the ASEAN model after it turned out that it was not prepared to accept any South Asian states. Since Pakistan does not have a receptive club in Southwest Asia either (Gulf Council for Cooperation, Arab League), the SAARC was founded in 1985, and great hopes have been attached to it ever since. The path chosen here was to exclude the conflict-prone bilateral issues ("contentious and bilateral") from the outset, which, however, deprives the organization of any room for maneuver, since India insists on bilateralism and the other states have no common borders. Above all, the SAARC offers a forum for discussion at all levels, while all states are always on the lookout for other alliances: Pakistan became a member of the RCD's successor Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which also includes Afghanistan and the six former Soviet republics with a majority Muslim population; neither India nor Pakistan were members of the APEC or the Aisatian-European talks in 1996 and 1998.

Pakistan once brokered the direct contacts between the US and China that led to the end of the Vietnam War; at the beginning of the relationship there were sporting encounters, namely table tennis (ping-pong diplomacy). In South Asia, this role is played primarily by cricket games, especially since President Zia attended a game in India as a "private person". In recent years there has also been a politicization of sport, which means that matches (have to) are canceled because Kashmir days are celebrated in Pakistan or a cricket pitch is plowed up in India to prevent an international match. But video and television ensure that we know more about each other again. Above all, Indians and Pakistani come close to each other abroad, as they are both perceived as "Asians" in the Gulf States or as "Pakis" in parts of England. "Indian" restaurants often turn out to be Pakistani-run.

The foreign policy dimension: distant neighbors

On March 14, 1998, the Pakistani government expelled an Indian diplomat because Pakistan had inconvertible evidence that he was involved in acts of espionage and subversion; As usual in such situations, the Indian government immediately followed suit with the expulsion of a Pakistani diplomat. Such reciprocal deportations have occurred again and again, especially after assassinations. In the present case, the Pakistani government charges the Indian secret service RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) Bomb attacks on railroad trains near Multan and Pattoki, in which several people were killed and several injured.(15) The Indian press countered that Pakistan reacted faster than India this time after the Pakistani intelligence service ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) was responsible for the attack in Coimbatore.(16) Pakistan is again held responsible for the railroad attacks in December 1997 and the attack in Bombay. As is so often the case, Pakistan chose an international forum for its allegations, in this case the Islamic Summit in Doha (Qatar), while India, which prefers a policy of bilateralism, found itself in the difficult phase of forming a government after the undecided elections in spring 1998. Neither side, however, was interested in letting the situation spiral out of control; Pakistan has therefore postponed the first test of its new medium-range missile Ghauri (named after the Muslim conqueror of northern India in the twelfth century);(17) the successful test took place shortly before the US ambassador's trip to the United Nations in South Asia and after the verbal attacks by the BJP. After the nuclear tests in May 1998, readiness to negotiate was again signaled.

This time, too, it can be observed that tensions increase in times of political uncertainty and weak governments. In 1997 things looked very different: At that time, Nawaz Sharif had won a landslide victory in Pakistan, and Prime Minister Gujral, an experienced foreign politician who presided over a minority government, could hope that none had come to power Party could be interested in another election. At the SAARC summit in the Maldives, the two leaders seemed to get along well; the fact that they were both refugees and were talking in Punjabi was seen as a sign of a pioneering rapprochement.(18) The euphoria was quickly dampened by reports of artillery fighting in Kashmir,(19) generally seen as a warning from military (and perhaps political) circles not to take the rapprochement too far. In the next few months Nawaz Sharif was able to expand his power after he had been able to assert himself against the President and the Chief Justice, but internal party and economic difficulties threatened; in India withdrew Indian National Congress the government's support (probably not because of the Pakistan policy), in the following elections in spring 1998 the BJP was able to gain; Nevertheless, the majority situation remained unclear for the time being. All in all, a situation that did not allow the political leadership in India or Pakistan to accommodate their neighbors. In the alliance of the parties around the BJP there are very different positions: for the regional parties Hindutva Far from being as central as it is for the BJP.

Uncertainties also grew economically: Neither India nor Pakistan achieved growth rates like those in the East and Southeast Asian countries; however, with their more regulated economy, they were spared the turmoil in Southeast Asia for the time being. However, disaster arose from the loss of customers (such as Pakistan's yarn exports) and more intense competition from the devaluation of the Southeast Asian currencies, especially in the textile sector. The bilateral trade between India and Pakistan remained unaffected due to the lack of mass.

The domestic dimension: useful enemies

The two neighbors are useful to each other, i.e. their power elites, as enemies. This is especially true for the military, which uses far more economic resources than can be read from the "defense" position in the state budget.(20) Both countries maintain professional armies whose common roots lie in the mercenary troops of the colonial power; the army's contribution to independence is modest (as you can see from the Indian National Army and the mutiny of the Navy) and the statehood of Pakistan is as good as nonexistent.(21) Both armies have retained their extensive autonomy and their innumerable privileges to this day with the one, decisive, difference that the Pakistani military leadership took over state power several times, while the Indian army is one of the rare exceptions in the former "Third World", which has always kept out of the political process and subordinated himself to the civil leadership.(22) The price for the restraint - in Pakistan since the sudden death of the former dictator General Zia ul Haq - is a lavish financial and technical endowment: In India, rather than in Pakistan, the army played a significant role in industrialization, not just in the armaments sector also in heavy industry, vehicle construction, nuclear and space technology and in the information and telecommunications sector. While Pakistan tended to rely on imported "latest technology" and "state of the art" within the framework of military aid from the USA and China or through commercial purchases with financial help from friendly Islamic states, India built its research and development in university and non-university as planned Area from: India's success in information technology (development and export of computer software) is directly related to this. The expansion of the infrastructure is also a concern of the military, with more emphasis on rail in India and more on road transport in Pakistan. However, India has much more worries here with China, which has a wide, sparsely populated and topographically demanding border area, while India's main settlement area begins right at the foot of the border mountains. In general, India's efforts are directed much more towards China, especially in the high-tech area. This is particularly evident in the case of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. After the military disaster in 1971, Pakistan's Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had his military leaders and scientists promise to develop his own nuclear weapons in Multan in 1972; just two years later, India brought a peaceful nuclear device (PND) near the pak. Limit to implosion: a clear warning to the neighbors and proof of political independence from the great powers. At the same time India, like Pakistan dependent on energy imports, stepped up its civilian nuclear research in order to be able to use more nuclear energy. Until May 1998, both countries waived nuclear tests if one of rumors such as a pak. Ignition in Singkiang takes place. Both countries are trying to develop launch systems, although the now successful Indian medium-range missile is hardly required for use in Pakistan: the entire Indus valley is less than 300 km from the Indian border. The claim of Dr. Qadeers, the longtime head of the Pakistani nuclear research program, that Pakistani missiles could reach every corner of India,(23) has since been proven and underscores Pakistan's claim to military parity.(24)

The usefulness of the neighbor lies even more in the political: But here, too, the conditions only correspond to a limited extent: India is far more suitable as an election campaign topic in Pakistan than Pakistan is in India. Even the reference to the threat posed by a possibly disloyal and rapidly growing Muslim population in India does not catch on as a topic everywhere, especially not in areas remote from the border with a less numerous Muslim population. However, this does not apply in reverse, as the BJP's election defeat in Rajasthan shows.

The question remains of the usefulness of the bilateral conflict for third parties:(25) In retrospect, one can say that India and Pakistan's foreign and security policy orientation was largely determined by the dispute with their neighbors. This was not without influence on the course of the Cold War: a complete "containment" (containment) the Eastern Bloc did not take place; without the threat in the west, India would have taken a more decisive position in the Afghanistan war. In the post-bipolar era, the beneficiaries are likely to be of a different kind: the drug and arms trade thrive particularly well in areas of tension; that political movements can easily finance themselves in this way should have been certain since the war in Afghanistan at the latest.(26)

The economic dimension: economic partners?

Little can be said about the economic relations between India and Pakistan: the volume of trade is small, even if smuggling is included.(27) Indian exports to Pakistan reached a peak in 1996 with a volume of US $ 196 million, but still only 15% of exports to the SAARC countries and 0.6% of all exports. Indian imports from Pakistan were only a fraction of US $ 41 million in 1996 (the previous maximum was reached in 1992 with US $ 136 million).(28) For decades there has only been one road and railroad crossing between the two neighbors, both near Lahore (Wagah); There is little traffic, the procedure cumbersome, and there is hardly any transit trade, as a result of the difficult conditions in Iran and Afghanistan and thanks to the restrictive Indian transport regulations. There is constant speculation about the opening of a further transition (in the process of being); Maritime transport is not important, most of them lack both the money and an entry permit for a flight. Air connections exist only between Bombay and Karachi, New Delhi and Karachi and New Delhi and Lahore; There is still no direct flight connection between the two capitals; telecommunications between the two countries has only improved in recent years. The extent and structure of trade without restrictions can only be guessed at: after all, in 1947 a uniform economic area was divided and ancient transport and travel routes severed. In Punjab, the same language (Punjabi) is spoken on both sides of the border, Urdu and Hindi originate from the same Hindustani, food and clothing are similar, if not the same; in short, there are no differences between the two countries that cannot be more pronounced, at least within India. In view of the existing restrictions, however, one wonders how justified the expectations of the agreed upon can be South Asian Preferential Trade Area (SAPTA). The fact that both countries are the World Trade Organization (WTO) should actually be enough to allow bilateral trade to grow into other dimensions (most-favored nation treatment, prohibition of quantitative restrictions). After all, the exchange rates of the two currencies have not been approved, but they are realistic. Due to their many international activities (and internationally scattered relatives), the leading business figures are often personally known to each other.

Expectations based on the complementarity of the two countries suffer from their unrealistic assumptions: In the foreign trade statistics, very different goods are summarized, so that the impression arises that exports from one country can be easily (and advantageously) diverted to the other . In fact, countries are particularly diligent in exchanging similar goods. Experience in cases where traditional economic areas were divided for a long time also shows that after the separation is abolished, completely different goods are exchanged than were previously traded internationally by the sub-areas; If all trade restrictions are lifted (and possibly complete freedom of movement), lasting changes in the economic structure must be expected.

In the case of Pakistan, merchanting should also be mentioned: for topographical reasons
Until this century, India's long-distance land trade was limited to caravans through what is now Pakistan to West and Central Asia. The rail link between India and Southwest Asia and Europe is still missing a section in Iran; but in the 1960s and 1970s road transport had increased rapidly, despite all the bureaucratic restrictions in India; since the revolution in Iran and the war in Afghanistan it has almost completely come to a standstill; with the economic upturn in India it could quickly pick up again. Also under discussion are pipelines for oil and natural gas from Iran and Central Asia, which should run through Pakistani territory, since India is one of the major energy markets of the future. In contrast, India is of little importance for Pakistan as a transit country: there is a direct road connection to China via the Khunjerab Pass (Indus Super Highway), trade with Bangladesh is small and with Myanmar completely insignificant and cheaper by sea; the transit to Nepal and Bhutan is only of political importance.

Pakistan, whose agriculture is based on artificial irrigation like hardly any other country, is in a strategically unfavorable location on the lower reaches of its great rivers. This problem was resolved as early as 1960 (Indus Water Treaty) by granting Pakistan the (almost) exclusive right to use the three western, and particularly water-rich, rivers Indus, Jhelum and Chenab and India that of the three eastern rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. India diverts the water of "its" rivers to its own territory before they reach the border; Pakistan fills the dry lower reaches of the Ravi and Sutlej (the Beas already flows into the Sutlej on Indian territory) through a large-scale network of connecting canals. This settlement has proven so politically beneficial that India has proposed a similar solution to Bangladesh for dividing the waters of the Ganges and Brahmaputra.

Outlook: continued successful crisis management?

According to UN calculations, India will have overtaken China in population by 2050, and Pakistan will then be the third most populous country on earth. There are no indications that India and Pakistan will experience a comparable economic upswing. If the tensions persist, the pursuit of military parity (India with China, Pakistan with India) will likely continue to be at the expense of the economic and social situation and domestic political stability.

Of the three wars, the one in 1965 was deliberately instigated (by Pakistan); the Kashmir war 1947/48 arose from the unregulated circumstances of the partition, the Bangladesh war 1971 from the lack of any willingness of the military and political leadership of (western) Pakistan to accept the decision of the election of 1970. The fact that there were no further major acts of war shows that there has been and is thoroughly successful crisis management. The Indus Water Treaty of 1960, the submission to an international arbitration tribunal in the case of the Rann of Kutch and the founding of SAARC and SAPTA have already been mentioned as outstanding achievements. Also worth mentioning are the 1988 agreement not to attack nuclear facilities in the event of war, and the exchange of lists of such facilities that took place in 1991, as well as a number of private initiatives aimed at improving relations. There are of course setbacks, such as the closure of the consulates general in Bombay and Karachi that have existed for a number of years, or the establishment of a "mini SAARC" that India formed with Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan,(29) and the nuclear tests of May 1998.

1. Kuldip Nayar: Distant neighbors: a tale of the subcontinent. Delhi: Vikas. 1972.

2. South Asia is not a new term in German: it was used more frequently before the Second World War than it is today, but mostly including Southeast Asia and sometimes also Southwest Asia (Turkey, Arabia); see also my article: Structural and Development Problems in South Asia. In: Handbook of the Third World, ed. by Dieter Nohlen and Franz Nuscheler. Volume 7: South Asia and Southeast Asia. 3rd edition Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz Nachf. 1994. pp. 14-53.

3. Samuel Huntington: The clash of civilzations and the remaking of world order. New York: Simon & Schuster. 1996. - Idem: Clash of civilzations. In: Foreign affairs. Summer 1993.

4. Stephen P. Cohen (ed.): Nuclear proliferation in South Asia. New Delhi: Lacer International / Karachi: Mackwin. 1991.

5. Christian Wagner: Regional cooperation in South Asia: Prehistory and inventory of the SAARC. In: Foreign Policy. Journal of International Issues. Hamburg: Interpress. 44 (1993) 2. pp. 181-190. - See also his contribution to foreign policy in this yearbook.

6. Jinnah: Speeches and Writings, vol. i, p. 153. After: Richard Symonds: The making of Pakistan. Karachi: Allies Books. 1966 (London: Faber & Faber. 1950). p. 57.

7. Walter K. Anderson and Shridhar D. Damle: The brotherhood in saffron. The rashtriya swamyamsevak sangh and Hindu revivalism. New Delhi: Vistaar. 1987 ([Boulder, Colorado:] Westview. 1987).

8. So on TV (BBC) in March 1998.

9. India's aggressive designs: N-policy may be reviewed, says Gohar. In: Dawn. Mar 17, 1998.

10. Citha D. Maaß: Foreign Policy. In: Dietmar Rothermund (ed.): India: culture, history, politics, economy, environment. A manual. Munich: Beck. 1995. pp. 450-482, here: p. 459

11. Hans Frey: The Indo-Pakistani conflict in the years 1958-1968. Contributions to South Asian Studies 38. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner. 1978. xix, 234 p.

12. Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry, Brigadier (Retd.): September '65. Before and after. Lahore: Ferozsons. 1977. p. 40.

13. Visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Delhi in spring 1997. Mark Nicholson: India-China air links agreed. In: Financial Times. May 21, 1997. p. 8th

14. Raja Anwar: The terrorist prince: the life and death of Murtaza Bhutto. London: Verso. 1997. pp. 193sqq.

15. Faraz Hashmi: Subversion charges traded. In: Dawn, Mar 3, 1998

16. K. Subrahmanyam: Pakistan pulls a fast one this time. In: The Economic Times. Mar 16, 1998

17. Faraz Hashmi: Pakistan gives up plan to test missile. In: Dawn. Mar 16, 1998.

18. Amal Jayasinghe: Gujral and Sharif seek 'clean slate'. In: Financial Times. May 13th 1997. p. 6th

19. Khozem Merchant: India denies missile claims ahead of Islamabad talks. In: Financial Times. June 6, 1997. p. 5.

20. See my contribution: Pakistan. In: Veronika Büttner, Joachim Krause (Ed.): Armament instead of development? Security Policy, Military Spending and Arms Control in the Third World. International Politics and Security Volume 45. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 1995. pp. 160-183. - See also: Citha D. Maaß: India. Ibid. pp. 130-159.

21. Stephen P. Cohen: The Indian army: its contribution to the development of a nation. New edition. Delhi: Oxford UP. 1990 (1971). - Idem: The Pakistan army: images of war, visions of peace. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1984.

22. Dipankar Banerjee: The Defense. In: Dietmar Rothermund (ed.): India. Op. cit. pp. 427-449

23. Literally, according to Dawn: "Our missiles can reach any part of India and we have full ability to defend ourselves." Dr Qadeer's interview: Nuclear program not rolled back. Dawn. Karachi, Mar 18, 1998.

24. The official date for the missile test is April 6, 1998; however, a first test is said to have taken place on January 18, 1998. See e.g. Hasan Akhtar: Pakistan test-fires Ghauri missle. In: Dawn. Internet edition. April 7, 1998. - Amit Baruah: Pak. tests 1,500 km range missile. In: The Hindu Online. Feb 11, 1998.

25. Stephen Philip Cohen: American interests and the India Pakistan conflict. In: Jasjit Singh (ed.): Asian security. Old paradigms and new challenges. New Delhi: Lancer Internatonal in association with Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis. 1991. pp. 133-154.

26. Diego Cordovez, Selig S. Harrison: Out of Afghanistan: the inside story of the Soviet withdrawal. New York, NY: Oxford UP. 1995. p.161.

27. The Pakistani black market is highly competitive; According to the author, based on his own impressions, the author considers that Indian goods should have the meaning that India likes to attribute to them as wishful thinking.

28. Own calculations (World: DOTS) based on: IMF. Direction of trade statistics, 1994 and 1997.

29. Kasra Naji: Asian nations plan new regional grouping. In: Financial Times. April 3, 1998. p. 4th

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