What is the current population of Turkey
Ethnic groups and minorities
The main population groups in Turkey include Turks, Kurds and Arabs. Minorities are Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Bosnians, Zaza, Lasen, Circassians, Turkmens, Yazidis, Roma and numerous other ethnic groups, whose proportion of the total population is small. Turkish is the national language, as a former multi-ethnic state there are a total of 36 other languages that are spoken within the various ethnic groups.
While in the Ottoman Empire the non-Muslim minorities and ethnic groups in millets (religious groups) lived next to each other without conflict (separate jurisdiction, compulsory poll tax to the sultan, cultural freedom), the process of Turkishization began at the beginning of the 20th century due to tendencies towards homogenization. As a result, the Turkish people merged with Sunni Islam.
The largest ethnic minority is the Kurds. Her home region is the southeast, so far a poor house that has not yet been able to participate in the prosperity of the west. The Kurdish question, i.e. the recognition of their cultural rights, has divided the nation for decades. The end of the conflict is not yet in sight, but the signs in the summer of 2015 were not bad to put peace and equality on the political agenda. The positive trend has cooled down at the moment, the guns are speaking again on both sides. In the course of the conflict that flared up, 500,000 people were displaced from the Diyarbakir region in 2015/2016. The conflict has also continued on a political level. Many of the Kurdish MPs who belong to the HDP have been arrested or had to give up their immunity.
Since 2015, Turkey's population has grown by 4 million people. In addition to 3.6 million Syrians who left their country in the course of the civil war, Turkey now also has 170,000 Afghan and 142,000 Iraqi migrants among its residents.
Different living environments
The new Turkish middle class
Since the strengthening of the AKP, the previously secularly oriented middle class has expanded by one dimension. Dr. Heinz Kramer sees four categories here along the lines of "religious - secular" and "modern - traditional".
The secular camp primarily includes members of the state apparatus, i.e. civil servants, the military, teachers, university and media representatives who are characterized by state-centered thinking and who judge from this perspective. Then there is a modern middle class in the metropolitan areas. Their representatives are mostly members of the younger generation, they are employed or self-employed in modern industrial companies, in the service sector, in the communications industry, in the media industry or in the education sector. Their lifestyle is modern, western, consumer-oriented. State ideology and religion have no special meaning. They are secularized in the true sense of the word and have no interest in either religion or politics. In the broadest sense, they advocate the liberal-democratic Europeanization with which the AKP entered the election campaign.
The modern middle class of the conservative religious camp leads a life determined by religious values in which faith plays an important role. Religion, however, is private and should not be prescribed by state action in the sense of a socio-political requirement.
The followers of the traditional line of this direction often have their roots in the Milli Görus movement, the main organization of classical political Islam. We find them as a group of the AKP; They form the core of a religious-traditional middle class with an Anatolian character, whose members understand the guidelines of the Islamic religion as guidelines of conduct that are binding throughout society.
There is also a distinction between village and urban. Often the attributes “uneducated”, “poor” are used for residents of rural regions. "Urban" should also be questioned as a term, because the majority of city dwellers live in suburbs and outskirts that are just as far removed from the bourgeois urban population as an Anatolian village.
In conclusion, it can be said that the respective classes are characterized by pronounced segregation. A spatial overlap, e.g. between secular and religious, is a recent phenomenon. The counterpart to this is West - East and is attributed identically.
Generation Z, who only know Erdogan's presidency, is eagerly awaited to influence future elections. Researchers attribute an important role to it.
Realities of life in East and West
Turkish interest groups have always devoted themselves to social and societal problems and projects, but mostly related to specific projects or needs. This area also includes the distinctive foundation system in Turkey, which is religiously or socially motivated and enables less beneficiaries to participate in education, culture and care.
Civil society engagement in the sense of political influence on the state, society and economy is a more recent phenomenon in Turkey and has been palpable since the 1990s.
Particularly well-known and influential are the associations that have dedicated themselves to the topic of “gender justice”. The organization KA-DER deals with "women's and children's rights". One of their high-profile campaigns aimed to increase the number of women MPs. Video spots and posters showed the activists how they creatively pointed out with a glued-on mustache whether one had to be a man to get into parliament. They were also involved in the revision of family law and achieved that paragraphs such as “The legal head of the family is the man” were deleted. Currently on the agenda of the activists is a campaign to shake up the public to protest against the abortion law that will pass parliament in the near future. The motto of the campaign is "My body - my decision".
Mor Cati is an association that aims to protect women from violence. On her initiative, women's shelters were founded, in which abused women receive protection and support. With public appearances and slogans such as “Erkek vuruyor - beating men”, they draw attention to the issue of violence in the family.
Gay Pride parades have been banned for several years. Lamda Istanbul works as an NGO for the rights of LGBTI people.
The topic of environmental protection is also slowly finding its way into civic engagement. Caretta Caretta, the turtle native to the Lycian coast, was to give way to tourism at the end of the 80s until committed citizens successfully campaigned for it.
The anti-nuclear power movement has flared up somewhat with the Turkish government's plan to build a nuclear reactor in Akkuya, but the protests against the dam projects also go unheard away from an intellectual city class and those affected locally.
In this area, ideological boundaries stand in the way of joint action. The actors are often located in political camps and fight each other instead of standing together: Religious - secular women's associations, state-loyal - socialist unions, secular business associations TÜSIAD - religious MÜSIAD.
The protests of various sections of the population over the events in Istanbul's Gezi Park were an exception and thus a new beginning of civic engagement. Started in spring 2013 as a resistance to the deforestation of trees in the park in favor of a construction project, the actions expanded to other cities. Images of police violence spread through social media as police officers used water cannons and tear gas to attack the demonstrators. This led to people from different ideological directions and without membership in political parties joining forces and publicly protesting against the autocratic and autocratic orientation of the AKP. The resistance also took on creative forms throughout. The state has accused the philanthropist and patron Osman Kavala of having financially supported these protests and brought him to court for subversive activities. His Anadolu Kültür foundation supports civil society organizations and actors in the fields of culture and art.
Politicians have been trying to build a social security system since 1999. A reform of the social security system came into force in 2006. However, the system is not yet sufficiently efficient. The families continue to form the social network if the state funds are insufficient. This is all the more bitter for the ten poorest provinces in Eastern Anatolia, where just one percent of GDP is generated. State welfare such as child benefit, social assistance or long-term care insurance cannot yet be claimed.
Unemployment insurance was introduced in June 2000. Their distribution capacity is still insufficient because the number of contributing employees is too small to adequately support the many unemployed / underemployed people. In addition, no capital could yet be built up. In principle, the unemployed are entitled to wage replacement, sickness and maternity contributions, job placement and training or further education. The mandatory contributions for employees and the state are 2%, employers pay 3%. Unemployment benefit is 50% of net income and is paid for a maximum of 300 days. In 2014 the unemployment rate was 10.1%.
Turkish labor law shows differences and similarities compared to German labor law.
Pension amount and retirement age are currently being redefined (Law on Reform of Social Security 1999, Law on Social Security 2008). So far, women have been able to retire after 20 years and men after 25 years of professional activity - regardless of the age of the applicant. The reorganization, with long transitional provisions for those who are already insured, stipulates that in future, new insured persons will not have reached their retirement age until they turn 65.
For a long time, Turkey was perceived from the outside as a country of emigration (population exchange and labor migration to Germany).
The issue of migration also has a strong national component. Indeed, intensive internal migration is preoccupying Turkey on a political, social and individual level. Migration movements within Turkey describe, on the one hand, migrations from south-east Anatolian villages to the cities of the south-east, e.g. to Van, Diyabakir or Hakkari, whose population increased by 3.2% annually between 1990 and 2000. The reason for this was violent clashes over the Kurdish conflict, which reached into the smallest villages. Military attacks against the civilian population, terror and pressure went hand in hand with a lack of economic prospects and poverty. People left their settlement areas or were asked to leave by the state. The metropolitan areas of the provinces appeared to be blessed. Most of the time, hopes did not come true. The overwhelmed cities could not offer work and security for everyone.
"The soil of Istanbul is golden - Istanbul’un topragi altin" it says. The metropolises of Istanbul grew by 3.3% annually between 1990 and 2000 and Antalya by 4.2%. Often some residents of the former villages and family members have already started and support the newcomers from their own homeland. These country team ties (Hemserlik) are the social network for migrants, who often only find work on the informal labor market, without employment relationships subject to social insurance or as day laborers. The immigrants find space in suburban settlements, so-called "Gecekondus - houses built overnight", often without any infrastructure and simply cobbled together houses. These areas are then opened up and legalized in the course of elections. The immigrants remain to themselves and do not form any connection with the urban majority population. Advancement is impossible in the first generation, the second generation also rarely manages, because education and family financial strength are inextricably linked. All that remains is to withdraw into one's own community and to preserve the mostly conservative world of values of the Anatolian villages.
Labor migration to Germany
The fact that people in Germany believe they have a "correct" image of Turkey is related to the issue of "labor migration". The more than 2.5 million people of Turkish origin in Germany determine the image of a country that is far more complex.
Over the past 50 years, numerous Turks have come to Germany to temporarily or permanently arrange their stay here for professional, political or family reasons. This led to another milestone in the close and sometimes complicated relationships between the two countries and their people. After a consistently friendly and European image of the Turks and Turkey in the 50s and 60s - also in the media - the picture changed. Arson attacks in Solingen and Mölln against Turks living here shocked the population. Demarcation and discrimination influenced the coexistence, a split in German and Turkish parallel societies developed. The media focus was primarily on critical events. The question "How can we live together?" is just a more recent attitude. Germany struggled with the idea of being a country of immigration. The topic of "integration" was therefore late on the agenda of numerous political and social groups.
Politicians, economists and academics are concerned about the phenomenon of the "brain drain", i.e. well-educated young Turks are leaving Germany because of poor advancement and career opportunities, stigmatization and exclusion in everyday life and at work. Turkey welcomes these returnees and gives them the opportunity to use their commitment and creativity. In Istanbul there are now regulars for returnees - networking and exchange included.
Turkish society is also often strangers to its German nationals (Almanci). For the modern elites in the big cities, they are backward and conservative, uneducated. Too free and too modern for the conservative domestic Turks, no more real Turks. For a long time the Almancilars were viewed with envy because they - supposedly - had a life in economic and socio-political security in Germany at their disposal.
Turkey as an immigration and transit country
Since the founding of the republic (1923), Turkey has been the target of a significant and constant influx of ethnic Turks, i. H. Muslim or Turkish-speaking minorities from the territories of their predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire. While this form of immigration largely came to a standstill in the last decade, new, large-scale migratory movements gained in importance, made up of refugees and asylum seekers, irregular labor migrants and transit migrants from parts of the Middle East, Africa and Eastern Europe.
Since the outbreak of war in Syria and Iraq, 3.6 million people have sought protection in refugee camps and the districts of major cities. This puts Turkey in third place worldwide of all countries that accept refugees.
Initially referred to as "guests" and given their stay for a limited period of time. It is now expected that many of them will settle here permanently. This has an impact on Turkish society and the economy, especially in the southeast areas around Gaziantep and in the major cities.
At the same time, Turkey is an important partner of the EU agreement, which is intended to limit the flow of refugees to the West and to take back refugees who have entered Greece illegally.
Population exchange and displacement
At the end of the Ottoman Empire, during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and at the beginning of the Republic (1922-1923), there was repeated population exchange between the Greek Orthodox population, who had to leave what is now Turkey, and the Turkish population in Greece. Between 1915 and 1916, large sections of the Armenian population lost their lives through deportation and displacement.
The population of Turkey has increased steadily since the founding of the republic. Today around 77 million people live in this area (1945: 18.8 million, 1960: 27.8 million, 1980: 44.7 million). The period of growth seems to be slowing down, as the current national average birth rate is 2.0 and population growth is stagnating at 1.5%. More than half of the population is under 30 years of age. Since this group of people is about to start the family formation phase, an increase in the population can still be expected. For 2030 there is a forecast of 85-90 million inhabitants.
This also means a challenge for the labor market, especially since youth unemployment is already 20% and modernization, internationalization and rationalization are likely to increase the problem. Over the years the degree of urbanization also increased, so that today more than 70% of people live in urban areas. The centers are Istanbul and the Marmara region, Izmir, Ankara, Adana and Gaziantep.
Households are becoming increasingly smaller, even if this is very different from region to region. In the western metropolitan areas of Istanbul / Izmir, an average of 3.7 people live in one family, in contrast to 7.5 people in the eastern Van.
The migration movements from the villages in the east to the cities and from Anatolia to the west are also noticeable in the population statistics.
Ataturk attached great importance to education in the establishment and development of the Turkish state. “The most important guide in life is knowledge” is one of his much-quoted sentences. Turkish socialization takes place through school. Education is very important in the eyes of the people. Teachers are respected everywhere. "Hocam - my teacher" as a salutation shows the recognition of a society for this profession. The appreciation is not reflected in the - rather poor - salary. Teachers are forced to do other work after school in order to secure a family income.
The importance of education for advancement is also shown by the fact that entire families and their relatives go to great lengths to enable a child to go to university. In the absence of a vocational training system, a university degree is the only way to move up or get a job that is remunerated to keep you going. From an economic point of view, education is tied to origin and also varies from region to region. While in the west the material equipment of the schools and the supply of teachers are sufficient, in the rather underdeveloped south-east there are lessons canceled due to a lack of teachers. In an already precarious life situation, the interest in buying books and teaching materials is often due to existential needs.
In addition, the prevailing teaching methods tend to be in favor of memorization and critical thinking is not anchored in the curriculum. According to the PISA study, educational reforms are: an increase in funds, reform of teacher training, strengthening of the vocational training sector and practical interlinking with the economy. Quantitative results are already visible: e.g. increase in pre-school attendance.
The school system was changed in 2012. After 4 years of elementary school, 4 years of middle school follow. Subsequently, the upper level can be attended in another 4 years. The change to general or vocational schools takes place after primary school. Religious Imam Hatip schools belong to the vocational institutions as well as technical or economically oriented schools. The Turkish Business Association welcomes the reform to meet the growing need for future skilled workers. The supporters of the AKP or religiously oriented parents will also benefit from the change, because the Islamic content and religious professional orientation can take place from grade 4 onwards. Secular circles see the reform as a "hidden" measure to fundamentalize society.
An entrance examination decides whether to switch to a secondary school. Depending on the result, the student can continue studying at a very or less recognized school. The high schools with increased foreign language teaching, the so-called Anadolu Liseleri, are in great demand. The actual lessons are preceded by a year of foreign language lessons. In Istanbul, the schools abroad in the various countries are also very attractive: Alman Lisesi, Robert Koleji, Galatasaray Lisesi, Avusturya Lisesi and the Istanbul Lisesi.
The diploma allows participation in the nationwide university entrance exam. Only those who have prepared for at least two years outside of the actual school lessons and who have attended weekend or evening courses for a fee in “Dershanes - learning institutes” can only pass. The examination decides on the subject and place of study. Those who have learned well can study medicine or engineering at a renowned university in the west. Those who pass the exam with a low score start studying in the East.
In total there are 101 state, 70 private and 4 universities of the Turkish Armed Forces. In 2013, 4.9 million young people were studying, and another 80,000 are doctoral students. 5.2 million are expected by 2025. International university collaborations are increasing, and there are various project collaborations with Germany on various topics. The training market is also facing internationalization.
Many scientists are concerned about restrictions and censorship as a result of the Gezi protests in 2013 and in the aftermath of the attempted coup in 2017.
The systems in place are insufficient to ensure adequate medical care for all citizens. A reform of health insurance is currently being struggled with, i.e. the introduction of general health insurance on a contribution-financed basis. This seems at least challenging given the large number of workers employed in the shadow economy.
The state health system consists of hospitals (providers: SSK, Ministry of Health, universities), polyclinics, health stations (variant 1: with nursing staff, variant 2: with doctor), resident doctors and other outpatient facilities.
Treatment is free of charge for the insured. However, the material and human resources are often inadequate, so that more than adequate basic care is not possible. Even in hospitals, patients are dependent on care from relatives. Drug shortages are not uncommon. There is one doctor for every 1100 inhabitants, which is far below the OECD average (350 inhabitants per doctor).
Those who are not socially insured are not entitled to benefits. For them and children under the age of 18 there is the green card (yesil kart), with which the poorest can seek medical help.
There is also a private medical care system that meets high international standards. Crisis medicine is also at a good level. The country's AIDS rate, although rising, is rather low.
The literacy level of women is 92.5, in contrast to only 1.4% (2015) of men are ignorant of reading and writing. Efforts to increase school attendance among girls have been effective, although the number of girls in secondary schools and universities can still be increased.
However, improving the situation of women is one of the great challenges for politics and society. The Global Gender Gap Study by the World Economic Forum, which measures the value of gender equality, found that in the areas of participation in the labor market, equal pay and women in management positions, the road to equality is still a long one. The number of women in political office also leaves a lot to be desired. With the founding of the republic in 1923, the ground was prepared for formal equality: women should be pro-western, visible in public life and well educated in order to contribute to the building of the new state.
Women and law
The legal position of women has been at EU level since the revision of family law. In 1988 a law on domestic violence was passed: third parties can file complaints on behalf of women. The police can prohibit the violent partner from accessing the communal apartment.
Since 2002, a new Turkish civil code has ensured the equality of men and women in marriage: The following has been deleted: “The head of the marital union is the husband”, “The choice of marital residence is incumbent on the husband”, “The representative of the marital union is the husband "," In the event of a disagreement on the question of guardianship, the will of the husband is to be given priority. "The marriage age for both sexes has been raised to 17 and" Separation of property with share of property "is the legal property regime.
The implementation has not yet reached the heads of the police, public prosecutors and judges sufficiently. Women affected by violence still find no support from the authorities and society.
Women and politics
Ataturk envisaged a prominent position for women in the construction of the new republic. As early as 1934 he introduced active and passive women's suffrage (long before many European countries). Nevertheless, scientists and experts from various think tanks claim that the situation of women has never been as positive as it is today, thus disenchanting Ataturk's founding myth of equal rights for women.
In the early 1990s, Tansu Ciller was the first female prime minister, but in June 2015 only 98 women (18%) were represented in the Turkish parliament. The pro-Kurdish HDP has 40 female mandate holders. Overall, the proportion of women is increasing in all parties. Due to the poor ranking on the list, the leap into parliament often does not succeed.
Family as a collective identity factor
Family is seen as a central value in Turkish society. It is the smallest autonomous unit in human life. Ideally, children are part of a fulfilled life.
A rural-urban divide can be observed in relation to divorce rates. The nationwide divorce rate is 11%, in Istanbul it is 13% and in southeastern Van 1%. Fortunately, however, the proportion of arranged marriages fell by 54%, although this is still good practice. In the assessment, a distinction can be made between forced marriages and arranged marriages.
Different forms of family coexistence can be found. The economic conditions determine the values between traditional and postmodern. Since the emergence of a religious middle class, this borderline no longer necessarily applies and traditionally living families can also be found in secure circumstances.
The extended family network over several generations can be found in the areas of the southeast and among Kurds. The major clans are headed by a ruling family, while the other families work the fields. The principles based on feudal structures intervene in the family affairs of the community. There are strictly demarcated spaces for the sexes and a strong segregation between men and women, between the public and the private sphere.
Also in the villages or the outskirts of the big cities (Gecekondus) there is a close cohesion and a strong social control over one's own family. In the village environment one was very dependent on the neighbors and thus obliged to adapt. Even after moving to the cities, this concept of honor was retained as a chance for survival in the new world. Religion became a means in social struggle. Ascent is associated with the support of needy family members.
So far, modern forms of life can only be found sporadically and only in large cities. However, the number of singles, women living alone, one-child families and couples is increasing.
Social structural principles
Saygi and Sevgi
Saygi (respect) and sevgi (care) regulate the hierarchical relationship from above and below within society, at work and within the family. Authority arises based on age, gender, and social status. This person is shown respect and respect. The expressions of respect vary depending on the context. They manifest themselves in visible behavior. For one family it is acceptable if e.g. the father is contradicted in discussions / decisions, in other families this is considered disrespectful and is sanctioned. For some, objection is only allowed in the closest family circle, for others also publicly.
The respected person takes care of the needs of the relatives. This typically results in a role-specific distribution of tasks within the family. The authority figures (father, older brother, mother) take care of the little ones (younger siblings, girls). Participation rights and delegation of tasks are distributed according to rank and reputation. There is a relative equality between the oldest sister and the younger brother. The father is often regarded as the normative authority, while the mothers often exercise the actual responsibility for bringing up children. In general, mothers have a special meaning and experience the approval of their sons even after their marriage. The daughter-in-law is referred to as "Gelin", "the one who came into the house".
Which behavior a person shows depends on the gender of the interaction partner and his or her affiliation to the internal / family or external / public area of life.
Namuz regulates the behavior of the sexes towards one another, especially in the area of overlap between “public and private / family space”. As a code of conduct, it determines which families, women or men are considered to be honorable and thus considered socially. It should be noted that a person cannot apply something on his own. Social - honorable - identity is only formed through recognition and show of respect from outside. If this ascription is made, for example, "temiz aile kizi - clean family girl", this is also shown in the fact that the gender boundary is preserved. This is how individual pride and social prestige are formed.
Family members orientate themselves in their behavior to the prevailing rules. What is honorable and how violations are punished depends on which social group the family belongs to. For example, in a rural region it may be imperative for a girl to change streets when a boy comes towards her. Going to a club alone is perfectly acceptable to another young woman and those around her.
Men see attacks on the gender of their female family members as a violation of their own honor. Behind this is the view that a man can stand up for his honor. A man has to take care of the preservation of a woman's honor, because it is assumed that the “inappropriate” behavior towards women comes primarily from men. The "protection" or the "restoration of honor" is incumbent on this understanding according to male family members.
Seref is the aspect of honor that relates on the one hand to the individual as personal dignity. On the other hand, it also has the power of a social structural principle and ensures the possibility of equality between the social units. Honor in the sense of Seref is given for service to society. People or professions that are related to their values, e.g. teachers, are considered to be honorable. Anyone who has the rank of "serefli adam - an honorable person" is obliged to reap the benefits of the community's honor, e.g. through generosity. Seref can be increased or decreased and can also be inherited, Seref / honor is hereditary because it is often about ancestry, historical roots and connection with history.
Honorable / serefli is only a person who is also considered to be honorable / namuzlu in the eyes of others. But not every honorable person is also honorable / serefli.
Music is part of people's everyday life and so genres and instruments are diverse. As large groups, Turkish art music, Turkish folk music with its shades (Özgün music, Arabesk, music of the Roma, the Kurds), and Turkish pop and rock music can be distinguished from one another. The musicologist Dr. Martin Greve researches the many facets of Turkish music and classifies them into familiar structures.
Examples of musical creation in a wide variety of styles:
- Selim Sesler plays Roma music.
- Ibrahim Tatlises represents Arabesk music, as does Orhan Gencebay and Müslüm Gürses.
- Ahmet Kaya (died 2000) was famous as a singer of left-wing Turkish protest music (özgün müzik).
- Tarkan is a Turkish pop singer who also became internationally famous with "Şıkıdım".
- Baba Zula originally played Turkish rock, combining rock, reggae, electronics with Turkish instruments.
- Aynur Dogan sings Kurdish songs. She also performs at European festivals.
- Sezen Aksu is the great lady of pop music. As a singer, songwriter and producer, she takes to the stage herself and also supports young artists in their development.
- Ceza does Turkish rap.
- Bandista is a music collective and combines ethno, ska and dub with a political message
At home in Turkish music are:
Turkish art music with oud, ney, violin and choir (43min)
Orhan Pamuk has not only been the Turkish writer who, together with Yasar Kemal, has achieved great international fame beyond the borders of his country, not only since he was awarded the 2006 Nobel Prize for Literature. "The Museum of Innocence" was published in 2008. In April 2012 in Istanbul, in the Cukurcuma district, the "Museum of Innocence", which belongs to the book and goes far beyond it, was opened. It shows "finds and artefacts of a fictional love" and forms the Melodrama of his city.
In addition, however, other names have appeared on the bestseller lists, the feature pages and in the literary business, which prove the creative explosion of current literary work. The new literary scene includes Murat Mungan, Ayse Kulin, Elif Safak, Perihan Magden, Tuna Kiretmitci, Hakan Günday, Murat Uyurkulak, Oya Baydar, Oguz Atay.
The literary work of this group is characterized by a departure from basic literary currents and a unified political stance. Ahmet Oktay, one of Turkey's most influential intellectuals, observes that in the new millennium, “the ideologies that influenced the literature of the republican era by permeating the subtext, the deeper level of meaning and the spiritual text structure, have given way to an individual attitude, and literature is far away every ideological influence of groups or currents produce. "
An overview of the literary work of Turkey can be found in the Turkish Library, published by Unionsverlag. These are milestones in Turkish literature of all genres that have not yet been translated into German and represent the era between 1900 and the present. The Literaturca Verlag and the Dagyeli Verlag also offer suggestions and information on the subject.
There are also German-Turkish authors such as Feridun Zaimoğlu, Emine Sevgi Özdamar, Zafer Senocak, Selim Özdogan, Fatma Aydemir, Yade Kara and Hatice Akyün.
For a long time, modern painting had a shadowy existence in Turkey. In academic education, too, it was mostly about dealing with European models and less about one's own creativity and conception.
This has changed fundamentally. The Turkish art scene is booming and exploding. Approaches, techniques, formats are as diverse as the topics that move the artists.
The center is Istanbul, which is also noticeable in the museum scene, which has founded an exhibition center for modern contemporary art with “Istanbul Modern”. In doing so, the city is responding to the increased international interest in Turkish visual arts. The artists working abroad and the processing of their creative ideas also find a home there. So far, the exhibits have been recruited from private foundations and banks. This should change shortly and the house will also exhibit international artists.
A lively gallery scene has developed in the neighboring district of Tophane. Here, too, the year 2011 gave impetus when Istanbul was European Capital of Culture. The concept artist Sener Özmen or the all-rounder Ebru Özsecen are only examples of the new artistic power.
Film, theater, dance
Nuri Bilge Ceylan, Cagan Irmak, Zeki Demirkubuz, Reha Erdem, Semih Kaplanoglu and Yeşim Ustaoğlu are the most important representatives of a new independent Turkish cinema that is also attracting great attention at international festivals.
The 60s and 70s are considered the "golden" era. Up to 200 films per year were produced in the Yesilcam studios in Istanbul. As a continuous film motif, there were stories about couples from different milieus who come together after detours and confusion. The 1960s also represented a politicization of the cinema. The echo of the putsch of 1960 can be found in Yilmaz Güney's "Umut" or "Yol".
Today Turkish cinema is becoming more and more differentiated. In addition to auteur films, mainstream cinema is also flourishing with melodramas and comedies. Overall, the domestic film industry is very satisfied. Around 40% of sales are generated with local productions.
Turkey's theater tradition is completely different from that of the west. Oral storytelling was widespread in Anatolia. Shadow plays and puppet theater were common formats. Only in the course of the re-establishment of the republic were state and municipal theaters based on the western model. Mainly translations from the west were played. Mushin Ertugrul is considered to be the founder of Turkish theater, Güngör Dilmen was one of the most influential theater writers.
In contrast to the boom in the visual arts and the film scene, creative theater work was limited to a few initiatives, which, however, flourished as a result of the Gezi protests. Scarce funding and political restrictions accompany the innovative work of the Istanbul Galataperform or the Krek Theater Companie, which was directed by Berkun Oya
All cities in Turkey have their own folk dances, which are accompanied by hand violins (Kemence), shepherd's bagpipes (Tulum) or drums (Darbuka). The horon is common on the Black Sea coast. The Kafkas tradition is well known in Kars. Halay is danced in the eastern Mediterranean region, in eastern, south-eastern and central Anatolia. There are many professional dance groups, so this genre has developed into an art form of its own.
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